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Throughout the past decade the American economy has grown in
the high technology industries and declined in the nation's basic manu-
facturing industries. Changes in production methods, which include in-
creased automation in both plants and offices, the increased use of
robotics, and the introduction of new materials and power sources have
marked this trend.
These technological changes have significantly impacted the lives of
American workers, and have led to reconsiderations of job content and
conditions of employment. Workers are becoming increasingly con-
cerned with job security. At times, the introduction of technological ad-
vances into the workplace has caused lay offs, reclassification of workers
into less skilled positions with lower pay, problems of retraining workers,
relocation of workers, transfers of operations, partial closings of plants
and complete shutdowns of certain operations. Workers are also con-
cerned with issues of health and safety in the workplace. They are being
asked to work with toxic substances, the long-range effects of which are
often unknown, or equipment such as video display terminals (VDTs),
the hazards of which are just being recognized.
Because these technological changes affect the American work force,
labor may be expected to assume a more active role in examining current
technology and adopting new technology. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) guarantees employees the right to bargain collectively with
management, and generally extends the duty to bargain to "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."' The NLRA
does not specify with any more particularity the subject matter or the timing
of the employer's duty to bargain. The National Labor Relations Board
(the Board) and the federal courts have attempted to clarify the duty to
bargain. This Article critically examines the law regarding the extent of
management's obligation to bargain with labor over its decision to intro-
duce technological change into the workplace.
The current state of the law, derived from decisions of the Board
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and the courts, has been inconsistent and confused. Generally, early
Board decisions evidenced a willingness to extend the duty to bargain
over the introduction of technological change early in the decision mak-
ing stage (decision bargaining), while the courts tended to restrict the
duty to a later time, requiring that the employer bargain with labor over
the effects of its unilateral decision prior to implementation (effects
bargaining).
The U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed whether an
employer has a mandatory duty to bargain over the decision to introduce
technological change. Recent Supreme Court and Board decisions
under the Reagan Administration, however, favor management's prerog-
ative to unilaterally change the workplace. The 1981 Supreme Court de-
cision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB 2 appears to have set the
standard which determines the existence of a duty to decision bargain.
In that case, the Supreme Court held that an employer does not have a
duty to bargain over the decision to close a part of its operation, but the
employer does have a duty to bargain over the effects of the decision.
However, the Court limited the holding to the facts of the case, and
stated specifically that it did not intend that its holding necessarily be
extended to other types of management decisions. The Court suggested
that subsequent cases be considered on their own facts.3
Since the First National Maintenance decision, the Board and court de-
cisions that address the issue of decision bargaining have generally
shown little sign of limiting the holding to the facts of that case. The
Board has relied on First National Maintenance in developing a standard to
determine when a duty to decision bargain arises. In recent decisions,
the Board has found that a duty to decision bargain arises only when the
decision turns strictly on labor costs.4 If labor costs are only one of the
factors to be considered, or are not a factor at all, any decision that re-
sults in a change in the nature or direction of a business does not give
rise to a duty to decision bargain.
The decision in First National Maintenance and subsequent Board de-
cisions that rely on it have established a restrictive model of collective
bargaining that is based on certain economic and political assumptions
concerning the role of labor in the collective bargaining process and the
role of the Board and courts in labor-management relations. The
Supreme Court balanced the interests of labor and management in deci-
sion bargaining in First National Maintenance, and concluded that the bur-
den that mandatory decision bargaining placed on the employer would
exceed any benefit to labor-management relations. 5 In doing so the
Court analyzed the effectiveness of collective bargaining and determined
that imposing a duty to bargain over a decision to partially close would
probably not alter an employer's economic behavior. Furthermore, the
Court objected to labor participation in the employer's decision on the
2 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
3 Id. at 687-88.
4 See infra text accompanying notes 103-42.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 76-87.
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grounds that it would add costs, delay and uncertainty to the employer's
decision making process.6 The Court concluded that effects bargaining
would adequately protect the interests of labor. 7
This Article critically evaluates the restrictive model of collective
bargaining established by the Supreme Court in its First National Mainte-
nance opinion and in recent Board decisions. Part I of this Article reviews
the legislative history of the NLRA and argues that Congress envisioned
collective bargaining as a positive, dynamic process, capable of evolving
to meet new problems and situations in labor-management relations.
Congress also envisioned a positive role for labor in the process, perceiv-
ing collective bargaining as a cooperative effort between labor and man-
agement.8 This Article examines the Supreme Court's departure from
Congress' view of collective bargaining.
Part II of this Article examines collective bargaining over technolog-
ical change. It discusses the interests involved in technological change
and the development of the law regarding technology bargaining. The
Article then critically evaluates the law bearing on technology bargain-
ing. The labor law of duty to bargain over technological change appears
to have developed in basically two directions. Health and safety issues
have been accorded great importance under the law. Any change that
affects health and safety is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Although
the law is not entirely clear on whether the duty arises at the decision or
effects stage, a careful reading of relevant cases suggests that decision
bargaining is required. Threats to employment conditions and security,
not involving health and safety, have not consistently been accorded the
same degree of importance as health and safety. This Article examines
this difference in order to determine whether the two positions are
congruous.
Recent court and Board decisions have taken a prevalent position
that management is more capable than labor of making certain decisions
and that labor's participation would only be a hindrance. This Article
provides some representative examples of labor participation in manage-
ment decision making which indicate that labor participation in the deci-
sion making process is both feasible and desirable. The Board and courts
may not be adequately considering current activities in the workplace
when they decline to mandate decision bargaining on the grounds that
labor is not capable of making any meaningful contributions.
I. The Legal Framework of the Collecting Bargaining Process
The duty to bargain collectively underlies the American labor rela-
tions system. Congress predicated the NLRA on the expectation that
private negotiations will reconcile the divergent interests of management
and labor while protecting the freedom of choice and efficiency of the
marketplace. Nearly all of the substantive provisions of the NLRA were
designed to effectuate collective bargaining.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 77-82.
7 452 U.S. at 682.




The statutory foundation for the duty to bargain is found in the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 7 of the NLRA reflects the
Congressional commitment to collective bargaining by guaranteeing em-
ployees "the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collec-
tive bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 9 Section 8(d) defines
collective bargaining as the following:
[T]he performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and con-
fer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment ... but such obligation does not compel either party
to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession.s
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act imposes a duty to bargain on the employer.
That section provides in pertinent part: "[I]t shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees.""
Congress' description of collective bargaining is notably vague. The
Act does not prescribe the subject matter of the duty beyond the general
provision "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment." 2 The legislative history provides evidence that Congress in-
tended collective bargaining to have a dynamic and expansive scope
designed to meet changing problems arising from labor-management re-
lations. Senator Robert F. Wagner, the sponsor of the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (the Wagner Act), strongly believed in the positive
role of labor in the American labor relations system. The following state-
ment made several years before the passage of the NLRA evidences this
belief: "By permitting labor to organize freely and effectively we can
convert the relation of master and servant into an equal and cooperative
partnership, shouldering alike the responsibilities of management and sharing alike
in the rewards of increasing production."' 3
Senator Wagner 'advocated early on that labor's participation
through the collective bargaining process could ameliorate the adverse
affect of technological change on the workforce and thereby positively
affect the national economy. In an extensive exposition on the Senate
floor on May 15, 1935, prior to passage of the NLRA, Senator Wagner
reviewed the events that led to the Great Depression, recounting the dev-
astating impact that technological change had exerted on the American
workforce during that time. ' Senator Wagner viewed the collective bar-
gaining process as a cooperative effort between management and labor,
designed to contribute to economic progress and social justice and
9 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
10 Id. § 158(d) (emphasis added).
11 Id. § 158(a)(5).
12 Id. § 158(d).
13 75 CONG. REc. 4918 (1932) (emphasis added).
14 79 CONG. REc. 7567 (1935).
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thereby stave off such economic devastation.' 5
The preamble to the NLRA reflects Senator Wagner's optimistic as-
sessment of bargaining's efficacy. It reads, in part:
Experience has proven that protection by law of the right of em-
ployees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife
and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly ad-justment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages,
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bar-
gaining power between employers and employees. 16
The legislative history surrounding the addition of section 8(d)'s
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" provides
additional evidence of congressional approval of a dynamic, expansive
model of collective bargaining. Section 8(d) was added to the NLRA
through the Labor-Management Relations Act of,1947 (the Taft-Hartley
Act). The original House bill proposed a narrow list of subjects over
which an employer would be required to bargain:
(i) Wages, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii) proce-
dures and practices relating to discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall,
seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer and as-
signment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and
practices governing safety, sanitation, and protection of health at the
place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v) ad-
ministrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing
subjects. 7
15 For an in-depth discussion of Senator Wagner's views on the collective bargaining process
and the role of labor in the process, see Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current Significance,
29 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 199 (1960).
In an article written to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Wagner Act, Senator Wagner
wrote:
Democracy must grow and adjust itself to the ever-increasing complexities of modern in-
dustrial life. We can avoid devastating depressions only by organized human effort, and
organized human cooperation on a scale as vast as the problems with which we have to
'deal.... [A] substantial measure of this organizing effort and guidance in economic affairs
must be provided by the Government. But the only escape from having the Government
assume an ever-increasing portion of the task is to develop outside of the Government a
concerted effort which will provide full cooperation and intelligent action on a large enough
scale to be significant. In short, the more effectively industry, agriculture and labor can
work together, and the more adequately they are organized to cope understandingly with
the economic conditions which they face, the more realistic it becomes to expect that they
rather than the Government will continue to occupy the largest areas in economic affairs.
Id. at 221 (quoting THE WAGNER ACT AFrER TEN YEARS 2-3 (Silverberg ed. 1945)).
16 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
17 H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11) (1947), reprinted i I NLRB, IEGISI.ATIVE HISTORY OF
rilE I.ABOR MANAGEMENT REI.ATIONS Acr, 1947, at 158, 166-67 (1948) [hereinafter I MRA His-
rORYI. For a discussion of this list of subjects, see H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23
(1947) hereinafter House Report, reprinted inl I. MRA HISTORY, snpra, at 292, 313-14. TIhe House
Minority Report commented:
This section attempts to limit narrowly the subject matters appropriate for collective bar-
gaining.... 'he appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a
formula; it will inevitably depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political
climate at any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related factors.
H.R. REIP. No. 245, Minority Report, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 71 (1947) hereinafter House Minor-
itv Rcportl, re/printed in 1 I MRA HISTORY, supra, at 362.
814 [Vol. 62:810
TECHNOLOGY BARGAINING
The House bill would have narrowed the scope of bargaining to the sub-
jects listed. Congress ultimately rejected the narrow list and incorpo-
rated the flexible phrase "terms and conditions of employment."
It is important to note that the adoption of section 8(d) through the
Taft-Hartley Amendments occurred during a period in which Congress
was restricting other aspects of the collective bargaining framework. Be-
tween the passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 and the Taft-Hartley
Amendments in 1947 the American labor system changed significantly.
Unionism thrived, and the principal concern surrounding labor-manage-
ment relations shifted from the right of unions to organize and bargain
to the rights of individual employees, the public and management. The
"Declaration of Policy," added by the Amendments, emphasized that
management's rights were to be protected to the same degree as labor's
rights.1 8 In addition, Congress extended section 8(5) (later changed it to
section 8(a)(5)) imposing a duty to bargain on labor as well as manage-
ment.'" The Taft-Hartley Amendments also attempted to limit the
power of the Board to regulate bargaining behavior. Congress was par-
ticularly concerned about limiting the Board's involvement in the sub-
stance of bargaining. 20 Thus, in response to sharp criticism, the Taft-
Hartley Amendments established bargaining requirements for unions
comparable to those of management and attempted to limit the Board's
intrusion on free collective bargaining. It also had the opportunity to
restrict the scope of bargaining by adopting the narrow list of subjects
proposed by the House. Instead, Congress reaffirmed its commitment to
the dynamic, expansive view of collective bargaining established under
the Wagner Act by adopting a flexible definition of bargaining in section
8(d).
B. Administrative andJudicial Authority
The language of the NLRA does not expressly authorize the Board
or the courts to specify what subjects are to be mandatory subjects of
bargaining. Shortly after passage of the NLRA, however, the Board be-
gan to make findings of unfair labor practices by employers who failed to
bargain over a variety of topics.2 ' Although the Taft-Hartley Amend-
18 Text of Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, reprinted i I LMRA HISTORY, spra note 17,
at 1.
19 Section 8(b)(3), added to the NLRA through the Taft-Hartley Amendments in 1947, provides
that "it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to refuse to bargain
collectively with an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1982). For a discussion of the extension of
section 8(5) to unions, see H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., st Sess. 30, at 40-46 (1947), reprinted in 1
ILMRA HISTORY, st/na note 17, at 544-50.
20 When Congress considered section 8(d), it was primarily concerned with prohibiting the
Board from regulating bargaining behavior, not the scope of bargaining. See House Report, supra
note 17, at 19-23, reprinted i I LMRA HISTORY, supra note 17, at 310-24; House Minority Report.
sulpra note 17, at 71, reprinted in I LMRA HISTORY, supra note 17, at 355 & 362; S. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947), reprinted in I LMRA HISTORY, stupra note 17, at 430. The Board's alleged
transgressions into the substance of bargaining were recounted in House Report, spra note 17, at
19-22, reprinted in I MRA HISTORY, supra note 17, at 310-13.
21 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir. 1941) (discharge); Singer Mfg. Co., 24
N.I..R.B. 444 (1940), enforced, 119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir. 1941) (holiday and vacation pay); Woodside
Cotton Mills Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 42 (1940) (workload and standards); Wilson & Co., 19 N.I..R.B. 990,
enforced, 115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940) (work schedules).
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ments attempted to limit the Board's authority to that of compelling dis-
cussion, the Board continued to make such determinations. 22 The
Supreme Court eventually upheld the authority of the Board to do so, 23
subject to review by the courts. 24
In the 1958 Borg-Warner25 case, the Supreme Court termed any sub-
ject falling within the definition of section 8(d)'s "terms and conditions
of employment" a mandatory subject of bargaining. 26 While the parties
are not obligated to agree on mandatory subjects of bargaining, they are
obligated to meet and confer in good faith and to seek to reach an agree-
ment. Failure by either management or labor to bargain over a
mandatory subject is an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(5).2 7 In
Borg- Warner the Supreme Court also distinguished nonmandatory or
"permissive" subjects of bargaining from mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. Management and labor may bargain over a permissive subject, but
they are not obligated to do so.2 8 If a subject is permissive, management
is free to implement changes without first bargaining with the union.
Generally, it is the union that challenges the exercise of management
discretion by demanding that management bargain over its decision to
act. The distinction between mandatory and permissive subjects of col-
lective bargaining strongly determines the extent to which unions are
able to influence changes in the workplace.
Since the Borg-Warner decision, the Board and the courts have been
cataloging union demands to bargain as mandatory or nonmandatory on
a subject-by-subject basis. The law in this area is far from clear, and a
detailed review of cases which defines the parameters of management's
duty to bargain is beyond the scope of this Article.2 9 However, it is use-
ful to consider general concepts and trends in those decisions.
The Board and the courts have focussed on two aspects of the duty
to bargain in determining management's obligations within the collective
bargaining process: (1) subjects over which management has a mandatory
duty to bargain;30 (2) the timing of management's obligation to bargain
over those mandatory subjects.3 '
'22 See ; NLRB v. Insurance Agents Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960); House Report, supra note
17, at 19-20, reprinted in 1 LMRA HISTORY, supra note 17, at 310-11. See also Inland Steel Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1, enPforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (pensions); Union
Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 322 (1948) (bonuses).
23 Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488 (1979). See also Cox & Dunlop, Regulatiol of Collective
Baganilinig by the National Labor Relations Board, 63 HARV. L. REV. 389, 400 (1950).
24 Fordl Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 494-95.
25 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
26 Id. at 349.
27 Id. at 348.
28 Id. at 349.
29 For detailed discussions of the case law which sets forth the parameters of management's duty
to bargain, see, e.g., George, o Bargain or .Vot to Bargain: .4 .ew Chapter il Iork Relocatiol Decisiolns,
69 MINN. . REV. 669 (1985); Gracek, The Ermployers Duty to Bargiai o 7erminatiol of Untit lolrk (pts. 1
& 2), 32 LAB. ,.J. 659, 699 (1981); Platt, The Duy to Bargain as A.-pplied to lranagemetrl Decisions, 19 AB.
I..J. 143 (1968); Schneidman, Industrial Decisions and Labor Law, 16 LAB. L.J. 404 (1965); Note, Partial
Closilgs. The Scope of A, Eployer Duty to Bargain, 61 B.U.L. REV. 735 (1981).
30 The list of mandatory subjects is extensive. See, e.g., Scope of LR.IIA Duty to Bargaiin, Labor Rel.
Expeditor (BNA) §§ 2-14, at 85-98 (Sept. 24, 1984).
31 See, e.g., First Nat'l Maintenance v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736
(1962); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561 (1966); Harper, Leveling the Road froim Borg-Warner to
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As discussed above, section 8(d) of the NLRA does not specify with
any particularity what subjects of collective bargaining are mandatory.
Due to this legislative ambiguity, the Board and the courts have devel-
oped the scope of the duty to bargain by balancing the interests of labor
and management on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, the law con-
cerning the scope of management's duty to bargain has developed
inconsistently. 32
The Board, until recently, has generally expanded the list of subjects
over which management must bargain more often than the courts have
done. However, both the Board and the courts have traditionally favored
management's rights when they have balanced management's interests
against those of labor.3 3 The Board and courts can curb labor's partici-
pation in the decision making process and, in effect, restrict the subjects
over which management has a mandatory duty to bargain by limiting the
scope of management's obligation to bargain to the effects of the decision
rather than to the actual decision itself.
In the collective bargaining process one can distinguish three peri-
ods in time at which bargaining could occur: The period before the deci-
sion is made, during which management is still deliberating; the period
after the decision is made but prior to implementation; and, the period
after implementation of the decision.34 Decision bargaining requires man-
agement to bargain with labor during the decision making process. Ef-
fects bargaining requires that once management makes the decision, it
must bargain with labor over the effects of the decision.3 5 Both the
Board and the courts have consistently interpreted effects bargaining as
requiring bargaining prior to implementation.36 As with the treatment of
the subject matter of the duty to bargain, administrative and judicial au-
thorities have decided whether subjects should be bargained at the "deci-
sion" stage or the "effects" stage on a case-by-case basis.
The Board explained the purpose of decision bargaining in Brockway
Motor Trucks 37:
First National Maintenance: The Scope of Aandatory Bargaining, 68 VA. L. REV. 1447 (1982); Kohler,
Distinctions Tlitholt Differences: Effjects Bargaining in Light of First National Maintenance, 5 INDUS. REL.
LJ. 402, 416 (1983); Litvin, Fearftl Asymetry: Employee Free Choice and Employer Profitability i First Na-
tional Maintenance, 58 IND. LJ. 433 (1983); Susser, .LRB Restricts Mlandato Bargaining Over .llanage-
rial Changes, 35 LAB. L.J. 415 (1984); Note, The Duty to Bargain Before Imrplementing Business Decisions, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1749 (1966); Comment, Mlandatory Bargaining: Partial Closing Decisions For Economic
Reasons Under the .\LRA-An Alternative to First National Maintenance v. NLRB, I 1 CAP. U.L. REV. 761
(1983); Comment, Bargaining Over the Introduction of Robots into the lWorkplace, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1135 (1984).
32 For a detailed discussion of the development of the scope of the duty to bargain, see Gracek,
sltpra note 29, at 659. Mr. Gracek outlines an historical overview of NLRB and court decisions con-
cerning the duty to bargain from 1935 to the present, dividing the development into 7 periods.
Gracek suggests that each of the 7 periods represents a major doctrinal shift, each shift reflecting the
political climate of its time.
33 Id.
34 See Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. at 561.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., NLRB V. National Car Rental Sys., Inc., 672 F.2d 1182 (3d Cir. 1982); Soule Glass &
Glazing Corp. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1055 (Ist Cir. 1981); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350
F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
37 230 N.I..R.B. 1002 (1977), enforceme nt denied allnd remanded, 582 F.2d 720 (3d Cir. 1978), snipp.,
250 N.L.R.B. 29 (1980), consenlt decree denlyilng enforcement denied, 656 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1981).
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The underlying rationale for requiring bargaining over such matters is
that the union . . . should be accorded an opportunity to engage in a
full and frank discussion regarding such decisions. In this way parties
are presented with an opportunity to explore possible alternatives to
accommodate their respective interests and thereby resolve whatever
issue confronts them in a mutually acceptable way.38
Imposing the duty to decision bargain on management affords certain
other advantages to labor as well. The union's right to bargain over deci-
sions strengthens its bargaining position concerning the effects of that
decision since it receives information concerning the effects earlier in the
bargaining process and is in a position to influence management sooner.
In addition, decision bargaining can help the union ascertain the verity of
management's position since it would be privy to information that it
might not otherwise obtain. Decision bargaining obviously affords labor
a more influential role in the American labor relations system than does
effects bargaining. 39
II. Technology Bargaining
For the purposes of this Article, "technology bargaining" refers to
collective bargaining over the introduction of technological change into
the workplace. Technological change can take numerous forms, some of
the most common forms are the following: Increased mechanization, the
introduction of automation into the office or plant, the use of robotics,
and the introduction of new raw materials or new power sources.4 0 The
introduction of technological change may or may not negatively impact
the work environment.
A. Interests Involved
Predictably, management and labor hold divergent views regarding
the introduction of technological change. Management typically favors
technological change since management benefits from product and pro-
cess improvements, increased productivity and reduced costs as a result
of the change. Additionally, management favors the unilateral discretion
to make decisions regarding the change, typically arguing that such dis-
cretion fosters unified decision making, reducing costs and delays, that it
allocates resources flexibly, maximizing profit and economic efficiency,
and that it is consistent with management's fiduciary responsibilities to
the corporate ownership.
On the other hand, labor is typically ambivalent towards technologi-
cal change, even where it could improve the work environment.41 Para-
38 230 N.L.R.B. at 1003.
39 One commentator has suggested that the practical differences between decision bargaining
and cfiects bargaining is one of degree. Kohler, spra note 31. For reasons discussed in the text,
iqfra note 172, this Article does not agree with that position.
40 For more specific definitions of these terms, see Leap & Pizzolatto, Robotics Tecliologyv: Te
Impltlicationls for Collective Bagainilng and Labor Law, 34 IAB. LJ. 697 (1983); Note, .-Altomatlioni and Collec-
tive Baigalinig, 84 HARV. I. REV. 1822 (1971).
41 Although labor is typically threatened by technological change, this observation does not sug-
gest that labor unions uniformly oppose the introduction of technological change. Union views vary
substantially over time, between and within unions, and according to the nature of the changes intro-
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mount among labor's concerns are the issues surrounding health, safety
and job security. Technological innovation in the workplace often re-
sults in the introduction of hazardous machinery and equipment, the in-
troduction of toxic substances, job lay offs, transfers of operations, the
reclassification of workers-frequently downward-which results in pay
losses, and the like. Labor's position is that an employee has, in addition
to health and safety considerations, a substantial personal investment in
his or her job to protect, since an employee typically has developed a
level of skill that may or may not be salable to another employer, accu-
mulated seniority and pension rights. From that position, labor argues
that because technological change affects conditions of employment so
significantly, unions should have an extensive opportunity to influence
decisions regarding technological change at the decision making stage
rather than merely bargaining over the effects of such change.
B. Development of the Law Regarding Technology Bargaining
The labor law regarding the issues involved in introducing techno-
logical change has developed in basically two directions at the same time.
The health and safety issues arising out of technological change have
been accorded special importance so that any changes that threaten the
health and safety of workers are clearly mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. However, the law is less clear regarding threats to employment con-
ditions and security raised by technological change. The law is also
unclear as to whether labor is entitled to bargain at the decision making
stage or only at the effects stage.
1. Duty to Bargain over Health and Safety Issues
Considerations of health and safety long have been accorded high
priority in the area of labor-management relations. Judicial authority
clearly holds that employee health- and safety are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining. The law, however, is unclear as to whether bar-
gaining must take place at the time that the decision to change technol-
ogy is made or after the decision is made but prior to implementation.
The Supreme Court addressed technology bargaining in Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB.42 While safety was not an issue in the case,
Justice Stewart stated that "what safety practices are observed, would . . .
seem conditions of one's employment." 43 Relying on that statement, the
Fifth Circuit held in NLRB v. Gulf Power Co.4 4 that safety rules and safe
work practices fall within section 8(d)'s phrase "other terms and condi-
duced. Much technological change takes the form of incremental improvements and thus does not
change the workplace abruptly or substantially. Incremental change is much less threatening than
change which results in replacing an entire process at one time. In addition, many unions have
supported technological change as a means of ensuring better working conditions and higher wages.
For example, the United Mine NWorkers actively promoted mechanization to improve the working
conditions of miners even at the risk of diminishing the number of jobs availablc to miners. Even the
most positive technological change can have a negative impact on the lives of workers.
42 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
43 11. at 222 (emphasis added).
44 384 I;.2c 822 (5th Cir. 1967).
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tions of employment," and are, therefore, mandatory subjects of collec-
tive bargaining.4 5
Numerous decisions cite Gulf Power for its general holding;4 1" how-
ever, to date, no NLRB or federal court decisions specifically have ad-
dressed the question of the timing of that duty to bargain. In Gulf Power
the company unilaterally promulgated and implemented a set of safe
practice rules without first bargaining with the union. The safety rules,
rather than changes or conditions within the workplace which affected
health and safety, themselves were the actual subject of bargaining. The
company argued that it generally would discuss safety with the union, but
that it would not bargain over the rules because, in its view, it had an
exclusive, nondelegable duty to promulgate them. However, the court
required the company to bargain with the union prior to and over promul-
gation of the safety rules. Arguably, Gulf Power proposes that anything
affecting health and safety mandates bargaining at the decision making
stage.
Although Norfolk and Western Railway Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers 47 involved the Railway Lab-or Act48 rather than the NLRA, it
relied on Gulf Power to suggest that Gulf Power mandates decision bargain-
ing. In this case, a railroad filed an action against the union requesting
declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the union from striking.
The railroad alleged that it was not obligated to bargain with the union
over proposed modifications of diesel units. The U.S. district court ruled
in favor of the union, finding that the union's proposals for modifications
of the units contained features to make the units safer and that issues
bearing on safety were mandatory subjects of bargaining. In so finding,
the court rejected the railroad's argument that the design of the diesel
units fell within an area of managerial decision making or prerogative. It
is noteworthy that the district court in this case required the railroad to
decision bargain over proposed modifications which contained features
to make the units safer, thereby not limiting the duty to bargain to pro-
posals which might render the diesel units more hazardous.
No other federal cases address the question of whether the duty to
bargain over health and safety issues extends to changes that benefit la-
bor as well as harm it. However, in Solano County Employees' Association v.
County of Solano,4 9 the California Court of Appeals found that all safety
issues are mandatory subjects of bargaining regardless of whether the
change benefitted or harmed employees. In this case the employer ar-
gued that the safety rule which prohibited employees from riding
motorcycles on county business benefitted employees and, therefore, was
not subject to a duty to bargain. The court, citing Gulf Power, rejected the
45 Id. at 825.
46 See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub oN., I.ead Indus. Ass'n v.
Donovan, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 571 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1978), aft'd, 441
U.S. 488 (1979).
47 459 F. Supp. 136 (W.D. Va. 1978).
48 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
49 136 Cal. App. 3d 256, 186 Cal. Rptr. 147 (1982).
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employer's argument and held that the employer was under a strict duty
to bargain over safety issues. The determination of whether the change
benefitted or threatened the employees' safety belonged to the employ-
ees as represented by their union. 5°
2. Duty to Bargain Over Technological Change
The law regarding the duty to bargain over health and safety issues
is more clear than the law surrounding the question of whether there is,
in general, a mandatory duty to bargain over the introduction of techno-
logical change into the workplace. The reason for this uncertainty
largely exists because technological change can take many different
forms and thus impacts the workplace in many different ways. Techno-
logical change may involve merely changing the processes within a plant
or office by introducing new production processes and methods. On the
other hand, the change may involve restructuring the operation so that
subcontracting, relocating the plant, transferring operations, or even
partially closing the business become necessary.
The complexity of the effects of technological change coupled with
the subject-by-subject, case-by-case basis of court and Board decisions in
cases involving technological change have resulted in an inconsistent set
of decisions. Nevertheless, it is useful to review some of the most signifi-
cant cases in the area to attempt to understand the state of the law sur-
rounding the question of technology bargaining.
In the 1960s, several Board decisions favored decision bargaining
over technological change. In Town & Country Manufacturing Co.,51 the
Board held that an employer must bargain with the union over the em-
ployer's decision to terminate a phase of its business operations, even if
economic reasons impel the decision. Town & Country involved a deci-
sion to subcontract hauling operations. Although the decision did not
involve a technological change, the Board relied heavily on Town & Coun-
try two weeks later when it decided Renton News Record.52 Renton News
Record involved a publishing company's decision to automate its printing
processes, which resulted in the discharge of composing room employ-
ees. The Board held that the employer's refusal to bargain over the deci-
sion to automate as well as the effects of that automation on composing
room employees constituted an unfair labor practice. In so holding, the
Board stated:
The change in the method of operations in this case is the result
of technological improvements.... [T]he impact of automation on a
specific category of employees is a matter of grave concern to them. It
may involve not only their present but their future employment in the
skills for which they have been trained. Accordingly, the effect of auto-
mation on employment is a joint responsibility of employers and the
representatives of the employees involved. .... Certainly, in some
cases, the adverse effect of changes in operation brought about due to
improved, and even radically changed, methods and equipment, could
50 Id. at 260, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 150.
51 136 N.I.R.B. 1022 (1962), eforced, 316 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1963).
52 136 N.I.R.B. 1294 (1962).
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be at least partially dissipated by timely advance planning by the em-
ployer and the bargaining representative of its employees. 53
Although Renton News mandates decision bargaining on the introduction
of technological improvements, it has not been followed widely for that
proposition.
The Board reached a similar decision in a related case during that
same time period, Unit Drop Forge Division.5 4 In that case the employer
unilaterally installed new equipment for handling and loading forges,
thereby eliminating one job classification and reclassifying another. The
Board held that the employer had a duty to bargain over that decision in
spite of the fact that it represented a "radical change" in the operation.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit merely noted that "[i]t seems to be con-
ceded that this is a type and degree of change about which there is a
statutory duty to bargain collectively .... 55
These decisions establish that during the 960s, the Board held the
position that an employer was obliged to bargain over both the decision
and the effects of technological change, at least where jobs were elimi-
nated in the process.
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, a number of circuit courts con-
sidered explicitly, in the context of innovations in the printing industry,
the issue of whether an employer has a duty to bargain over technologi-
cal change. Although the courts generally ascribed to the Board's posi-
tion that technological change is a mandatory subject of bargaining, they
were less clear regarding the timing of that duty.
Within four years, the Eighth Circuit decided several cases that gen-
erally relied on the Board's decision in Renton News. In the first of those
decisions, NLRB v. Columbia Tribune Publishing Co. ,56 the Tribune Publish-
ing Company decided to automate its printing processes by switching
from the hot metal process to the cold type or photo composition pro-
cess. The change caused the lay off of at least one-half of the composing
room employees and the downward reclassification of most of the re-
maining employees. The employer failed to notify the union of the deci-
sion until after it was made, just prior to delivery of the new equipment.
In finding the employer had committed an unfair labor practice by failing
to bargain over the introduction of the automation, the court stated:
It would seem indisputable, therefore, that the technological change
brought to the composing room operation was an issue requiring dis-
cussion between management and the union which had jurisdiction
over the composing room .... Because the effect of automation on the
bargaining unit was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the
employer had a statutory duty to confer in good faith with the union
over the issue. 57
The opinion contains no evidence that the union ever sought to partici-
53 Id. at 1297.
54 171 N.I..R.B. 600, eforced, 412 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1969).
55 412 F.2d at 109.
56 495 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1974).
57 Id. at 1391 (emphasis added).
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pate in the decision making process. The union merely sought, during
negotiations over a new bargaining contract, to retain jurisdiction over
the composing room work which the automation had substantially
changed. Although the court in Columbia Tribune relied on the Board's
decision in Renton News,58 it did not go so far in its holding as to mandate
decision bargaining over technological change. The opinion only stated
that the "effect" of the automation on the bargaining unit is a mandatory
subject of bargaining.
Similarly, in Omaha Typographical Union v. NLRB,5 decided by the
Eighth Circuit two years later, the court held specifically that the effect of
automation on a bargaining unit was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
That case involved the introduction of optical character readers, called
scanners, into the composing room where the company previously had
been using a combination of hot and cold type processes. As in Columbia
Tribune, the opinion does not indicate that the union sought to bargain
over the decision to purchase the scanners. The union claimed that the
use of the scanner was work within its jurisdiction and sought to bargain
over the effects of its use.
Four years after the Columbia Tribune decision, in Metromedia, Inc. v.
NLRB,°O the Eighth Circuit again relied on Columbia Tribune to hold that
the effect of automation is a mandatory subject of bargaining. Metromedia
involved the decision to acquire two "minicams," which are lightweight,
portable television cameras, to cover news events and for commercial
purposes. In addition to unilaterally deciding to acquire and use the
minicams, Metromedia also unilaterally decided to freely assign employ-
ees from all departments and all bargaining units to use the cameras. The
court found that Metromedia's actions constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice under section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. In so finding, the court stated:
It is clear that minicams are a technological innovation with the
potential to profoundly affect the work of the motion picture camera-
men. In view of their many advantages, it is likely that they will in-
creasingly be employed as substitutes for motion picture cameras.
The company was, therefore, obligated to bargain in good faith with
the IATSE over their introduction and use. 6 1
Although this language would seem to suggest that the court was ex-
panding the duty to bargain to the decision making stage ("the company
was . . . obligated to bargain . . . over their introduction"6 2), the court
spoke of the duty in terms of effects bargaining:
Metromedia also argues that, under our Columbia Tribune decision,
it was required only to bargain over the effect of the technological
change upon unit operations, and that it met this requirement by offer-
ing special severance pay and employment guarantee proposals which
the union rejected. We disagree. Metromedia did not attempt to bar-
gain in good faith with IATSE regarding the changes the minicam
58 Id. at 1390.
59 545 F.2d 1138 (8th Cir. 1976).
60 586 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1978).
61 Id. at 1187.
62 Id.
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would make in IATSE unit work. Rather, it presented the IATSE rep-
resentatives with a fait accompli. Metromedia's subsequent proposals
were merely offers to bargain over the effect upon the cameramen of
Metromedia's unilateral award of exclusive minicam jurisdiction to the
IBEW. This is not the good faith bargaining about the eect of techno-
logical change upon unit work required by Columbia Tribune.63
Other courts generally have not followed the Columbia Tribune line of
cases. However, a 1980 Tenth Circuit case, Newspaper Printing Corp. v.
NLRB, 64 cited Columbia Tribune in holding that the effect of automation
on the bargaining unit was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
In that case, again involving the printing industry, the publishing com-
pany unilaterally decided to replace hot type processing with cold type
processing. The company informed the union that it intended to intro-
duce the new technology during contract negotiations for a new contract.
The union did not seek to bargain over the decision to automate but it
did seek to bargain over the effects of the automation, specifically the
effect on the bargaining unit, the extent of potential job displacement,
and the right of unit employees to operate the new equipment. 65
The United States Supreme Court followed this trend of requiring
only effects, not decision bargaining. In 1981 the Court issued its opin-
ion in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,66 which has raised many
questions concerning the future of a mandatory duty to decision bargain.
Although the case does not involve technological change, its interpreta-
tion of decision bargaining is especially important for future applications
to management decisions affecting technology. The employer in First
National Maintenance, a corporation in the business of providing cleaning
and maintenance services, unilaterally terminated a contract with a nurs-
ing home and subsequently discharged its employees who had been as-
signed to work there. The union that had been certified as the
bargaining representative of the corporation's employees at the nursing
home requested a delay in the termination of the employees for the pur-
pose of bargaining. The administrative law judge, the Board and the
Second Circuit all found that the employer had committed an unfair la-
bor practice by failing to bargain with the union over its decision to termi-
nate the contract as well as the effect of that change on the bargaining
unit employees. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the em-
ployer had a mandatory duty to bargain only over the efects of the deci-
sion to stop work at the nursing home, but not the decision itself.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, began his opinion by ar-
guing that Congress adopted the general language, "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions," to give the Board the power to define those
terms "in light of specific industrial practices."6 7 Blackmun then went on
to conclude that the Board must define those terms narrowly in deter-
mining which subjects constitute mandatory subjects of bargaining be-
63 Id. at 1 188 (emphasis added).
64 625 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
65 Id. at 959.
(66 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
(i7 Id. at 6(75.
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cause "Congress had no expectation that the elected union
representative would become an equal partner in the running of the busi-
ness enterprise ... ."68
Blackmun characterized various management decisions according to
their propriety as mandatory subjects of collective bargaining. Accord-
ing to Blackmun, decisions only indirectly affecting the employment rela-
tion (e.g., "choice of advertising and promotion, product type and design,
and financing arrangements" 6 9 ) were not mandatory subjects of bargain-
ing. In contrast, decisions "almost exclusively" 70 part of the relationship
between employer and employee (e.g., "order of succession of lay-offs
and recalls, production quotas, and work rules" 71 ) could be categorized
as mandatory subjects of bargaining. Blackmun then examined the facts
of First National Maintenance and concluded that they constituted a special
type of management decision, one that directly impacted employment
(jobs were eliminated), but which focussed only on "economic profitabil-
ity." 72 He characterized that decision as "involving a change in the scope
and direction of the enterprise ... akin to the decision whether to be in
business at all, 'not in [itself] primarily about conditions of employment,
though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate
employment.' "73
After characterizing the First National Maintenance decision as one
that directly affected employment but which was based on economic
profitability, Blackmun set forth a substantive value judgement which had
no foundation in the NLRA nor its legislative history: "Management
must be free from the constraints of the bargaining process to the extent
essential for the running of a profitable business."7 4 Thus, having hinted
at the outcome in advance, Blackmun then proposed a balancing test to
be used to weigh management's interests against those of labor in order
to determine whether a subject should be a mandatory subject of
bargaining:
[I]n view of an employer's need for unencumbered decisionmaking,
bargaining over management decisions that have a substantial impact
on the continued availability of employment should be required only if
the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective-bar-
gaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of
business. 5
Blackmun looked at the history of the NLRA to support his balanc-
ing test:
[T]he Act is not intended to serve either party's individual interest, but
to foster in a neutral manner a system in which the conflict between
68 Id. at 676.
69 Id. at 676-77.
70 Id. at 677.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
74 Id. at 678-79.
75 Id. at 679.
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these interests may be resolved. It seems particularly important,
therefore, to consider whether requiring bargaining over this sort of
decision will advance the neutral purposes of the Act. 76
Blackmun failed to offer any references to the statute or the legislative
history of the NLRA in support of that interpretation.
Blackmun's majority opinion then evaluated the interests of manage-
ment and labor in decision bargaining. The opinion minimized labor's
interest and potential contributions to the decision making process.
Blackmun defined labor's interest as a concern over job security, and
stated that labor's practical purpose and uniform goal in participating in
the decision making process was to "seek to delay or halt the closing."7 7
In further minimizing labor's contributions to the decision making pro-
cess, Blackmun added:
No doubt it will be impelled, in seeking these ends, to offer conces-
sions, information, and alternatives that might be helpful to manage-
ment or forestall or prevent the termination of jobs. It is unlikely,
however, that requiring bargaining over the decision itself, as well as
its effects, will augment this flow of information and suggestions. 78
The majority feared that decision bargaining "could afford a union a
powerful tool for achieving delay, a power that might be used to thwart
management's intentions in a manner unrelated to any feasible solution
the union might propose." 7 9 Blackmun suggested that by "prohibit[ing]
partial closings motivated by antiunion animus, when done to gain an
unfair advantage,"8 0 section 8(a)(3) adequately protected labor's inter-
ests. This argument assumes that labor's interests in fair dealing with
management are protected as long as management's decisions are not
motivated by explicit hostility toward labor.
In contrast to the pessimistic assessment of labor's role in the collec-
tive bargaining process, the majority opinion described management's
interests as more compelling and viewed management's role
optimistically:
(M)anagement may have great need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy
in meeting business opportunities and exigencies. It may face signifi-
cant tax or securities consequences that hinge on confidentiality, the
timing of a plant closing, or a reorganization of the corporate struc-
ture. The publicity incident to the normal process of bargaining may
injure the possibility of a successful transition or increase the eco-
nomic damage to the business. s'
Blackmun then asserted that decision bargaining constituted an exercise
in futility because an employer may have no feasible alternatives to its
decision, in which case required good faith bargaining would cause only
additional delay and loss. He also suggested that a duty to bargain did
76 Id. a 680-81.
77 Id. a (i81.
78 Id.
7() Id. 683.
80 Id. a( 682.
81 Id. al (682-83.
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not have to be imposed on an employer because employers have an in-
centive to bargain voluntarily with labor whenever labor costs are a factor
and concession by labor could contribute to business profitability. 8 2
In the process of balancing management and labor interests to de-
termine whether the duty to bargain existed, the majority also considered
evidence of current labor practice as an indication of what was feasible
through collective bargaining. The Court found that the evidence
weighed against decision bargaining. In support of that conclusion the
Court cited evidence of the rarity of decision bargaining provisions, and
in contrast, of the prevalence of notice and "effects" provisions in ex-
isting collective bargaining agreements.8 3 However, notice provisions
require that labor be supplied with information about technological
change in advance to allow time to discuss with management any impact
such change may have on labor before its implementation. These provi-
sions may be accompanied by a specific time requirement within which
management has to notify labor, such as six months to one year prior to
the change. Therefore the Court's conclusion is not well-founded. Un-
ions have exercised their decision bargaining rights where they did not
have decision bargaining clauses in their contracts, but did have notice
and effects clauses.84 Notice provisions arguably are included in con-
tracts to provide unions with an opportunity to decision bargain over the
subject in question. In addition, the prevalence of notice and effects lan-
guage does not prove that unions have waived their right to decision bar-
gain. The Board has held that a contractual waiver of a union's right to
bargain over mandatory subjects must be "clear and unmistakable." 85
The existence of notice and effects provisions in the absence of specific
decision bargaining provisions does not constitute "clear and unmistaka-
ble" waivers of the right to decision bargain.
Finally, the Court argued that the presumption of a duty to decision
bargain creates substantial uncertainty concerning the limits of preroga-
tives for both management and labor. The Court determined that the
uncertainty surrounding the timing and extent of the duty weighed
against the imposition of a duty.86
After balancing the interests of management and labor and factoring
in the evidence of current labor practice and the uncertainty that the
Court perceived surrounding the duty to decision bargain, Blackmun's
opinion concluded that:
the harm likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in
deciding whether to shut down part of its business purely for eco-
nomic reasons outweighs the incremental benefit that might be gained
through the union's participation in making the decision, and we hold
that the decision itself is not part of § 8(d)'s "terms and conditions,"
82 Id. at 682.
83 Id. at 684.
84 See. e.g., ifra text accompanying note 206.
85 See, e.g. NRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1953); Allied Mills, Inc., 218
N.I.R.B. 281 (1975); New York Mirror, 151 N.I.R.B. 834 (1965).
86 For a critical discussion of the decisions on which the Fis . ational .lIaiiltelna7l(e majority relied
in making this argument, see Gracek, supra note 29, at 715.
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... over which Congress has mandated bargaining. 87
Blackmun attempted to limit the holding to the specific facts of the
case. He emphasized that in First National Maintenance the employees
were unable to influence the immediate cause of the closing because the
closing resulted from a contract dispute between management and a third
party over a management fee. An employer, however, could generally
cite an external cause for most decisions, rendering that distinction an
ineffective limitation. Although Blackmun appeared to limit the holding
to the facts of the case, his concluding remarks appeared to broadly re-
ject decision bargaining over decisions to close that were made for "eco-
nomic reasons,"8 8 thereby ruling out a mandatory duty to decision
bargain in most partial closing cases. In a footnote, however, Blackmun
stated: "In this opinion we of course intimate no view as to other types
of management decisions, such as plant relocations, sales, other kinds of
subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered on their
particular facts." 8 9 As discussed below, the Board and court decisions
issued since the First National Maintenance decision have generally shown
little sign of limiting that holding to partial closing decisions.
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Mar-
shall, wrote in support of decision bargaining and disagreed with the ma-
jority's pessimistic assessment of the role of labor in the collective
bargaining process. Brennan argued that the majority's balancing test
considered only the interests of management and completely failed to
consider the "legitimate employment interests of the workers."90 Bren-
nan also criticized the majority for underestimating the positive role that
labor could play in labor relations. In so doing, he cited the negotiations
between the Chrysler Corporation and the United Auto Workers which
resulted in significant adjustments that contributed to Chrysler's ability
to remain in business."'
Brennan also criticized the Court's presumption that management
needs "speed, flexibility, and secrecy" to make closing decisions. Admit-
ting that in some cases business interests could be frustrated by having to
bargain, he argued that most business decisions do not require "speed,
flexibility, and secrecy." Citing the majority's holding that an employer
has an unequivocal duty to bargain over the effects of its decisions, Bren-
nan noted that "it is difficult to understand why additional bargaining
over the closing itself would necessarily unduly delay or publicize the
decision."92
In his concluding remarks, Brennan avoided the question of the
scope of the duty to bargain, arguing that the question is properly left to
the Board to decide. Brennan, however, advocated a presumption in
favor of a duty to bargain that could be rebutted by a showing of futility,
exigent financial circumstances, or reasons for which bargaining would
87 First Nat l Mainitenance, 452 U.S. at 686.
88 Id.
89 Id. at n.22.
90 Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 690.
92 Id. at 691.
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not further the purposes of the NLRA.93
Within three weeks of the Supreme Court's decision in First National
Maintenance, NLRB General Counsel William Lubbers sent a memoran-
dum to the Board's regional directors, officers-in-charge, and resident
officers in which he narrowly construed the Court's holding.9 4 The Gen-
eral Counsel emphasized that the court had limited its holding to economi-
cally motivated decisions to partially close. He stated that, under current
Board law, decisions concerning automation, consolidation, plant reloca-
tion and subcontracting were considered mandatory subjects of decision
bargaining, and that First National Maintenance did not contradict the
Board's position on those subjects since they were not decisions about
whether to remain in business. The General Counsel advised that deci-
sions about whether to remain in business would be analyzed on a case-
by-case basis to determine if they could be distinguished from First Na-
tional Maintenance and if labor costs or other factors might render a case
amenable to bargaining. He also stated that if an employer's decisions
were based on economic factors not related to labor costs, but conces-
sions by labor could offset the economic factors, those decisions would
be considered mandatory subjects of decision bargaining.
Initially, the Board narrowly interpreted First National Maintenance.
In an automation case decided the next year, Plymouth Locomotive Works,
Inc.,95 the Board found that an employer had committed an unfair labor
practice by failing to bargain over a decision to automate. The employer
determined that a computer could perform the duties of the timekeeper,
and subsequently eliminated the position without first bargaining over
the decision. In finding that the employer had violated section 8(a)(5),
the Board stated: "[W]here the automation of bargaining unit work will
result in the elimination of unit jobs, it is the duty of the employer to
bargain with its employees' bargaining representative over the decision
to install automated equipment as well as the effects of such decision."9 6
In another 1982 decision, Bob's Big Boy Family Restaurant,9 7 the Board
again narrowly interpreted First Naiional Maintenance and expansively in-
terpreted subcontracting, yet consistent with the Supreme Court's
Fibreboard decision. The Board found that the employer had a duty to
bargain over its decision to discontinue its shrimp processing operations,
which resulted in the termination of unit employees, and its decision to
contract out the work so that shrimp was still supplied to its restaurants.
The Board held that in order to determine whether an employer has a
duty to decision bargain over its decision to modify its operation, the
Board must first determine whether the decision concerns subcontract-
ing unit work, which requires decision bargaining under Fibreboard, or
whether it concerns a partial closure, which does not require decision
bargaining under First National Maintenance. The Board reasoned that
such an analysis first requires that the business be accurately character-
93 Id.
94 Op. Off. General Counsel 38 (July 27, 1981), DLR No. 143, F-l 72781.
95 261 N.L.R.B. 595 (1982).
96 Id. at 602.
97 264 N.L.R.B. 1369, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1354 (1982).
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ized. Once the business is characterized, the Board would then deter-
mine whether the decision would substantially alter the direction of the
business. If the direction of the business is substantially altered, then the
decision is considered to be one to partially close the business. If the
direction is not substantially altered, the decision is considered to be one
to simply subcontract the operation. In this case, the Board character-
ized the employer's business as that of providing prepared foodstuffs to
its individual restaurants. For a time, it processed shrimp itself to dis-
tribute to its restaurants. Later, it made the decision to subcontract that
work to an outside processor, but the employer remained in the business
of providing foodstuffs to its restaurants. Therefore, the direction of its
business was not altered, and the law required decision bargaining. 9 8
The Board acknowledged that the distinction is not always clear, and that
a case-by-case analysis would be required with several factors being con-
sidered: The nature of the employer's business before and after the ac-
tion is taken; the extent of capital expenditures; the basis for the action;
and the suitability for resolution of the situation within the collective bar-
gaining process.99
Instead of clarifying the issue and promoting consistency, however,
the Board only casted further confusion on the issue of decision bargain-
ing. The very same day Bob's Big Boy was decided, the Board decided
Liberal Market, Inc. ,'o in which it came to the opposite conclusion over a
set of facts nearly identical to those in Bob's Big Boy. In Liberal Market,
Inc., the employer operated a chain of retail grocery stores which it sup-
plied through its warehouse and delivery operation. The employer de-
cided to close its warehouse and garage operations, partially in response
to labor costs, and to subcontract with an outside business to provide
those services. The Board characterized the warehouse and garage oper-
ations as integral portions of the retail business, the closing of which con-
stituted a partial closure, not requiring decision bargaining per the First
National Maintenance decision. The employer had not supplied wholesale
grocery items, warehouse space or delivery service to any other firms; it
had simply provided those services to itself as incident to its retail busi-
ness, much as the employer in Bob's Big Boy had discontinued its shrimp
processing operation largely in response to escalating market prices of
shrimp and problems encountered in maintaining the grading size of
shrimp."" However, although the two situations were virtually identi-
cal-in fact, the Liberal Market situation was perhaps more compelling
since the decision there turned on labor costs-the Board found a duty
to decision bargain in Bob's Big Boy but not in Liberal Market. The only
significant difference between the two cases appears to lie in the compo-
sition of the Board hearing the two cases that day.'0 2
98 Id. at 1371, 111 I..R.R.M. (BNA), at 1356.
99 Id. at 1370, 111 I..R.R.M. (BNA), at 1355.
100 264 N.I,.R.B. 807, 111 I.R.R.M. (BNA) 1326 (1982).
101 Id., 111 I..R.R.M. (BNA), at 1327.
102 In Bobs Big Boy, the majority consisted of Fanning, Jenkins and Zimmerman with Van de
Water and Hunter each concurring and dissenting. In Liberal .\larke, Zimmerman and Hunter con-
stituted the majority with Jenkins dissenting.
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Two other cases were decided by the Board during the year after
First National Maintenance, both of which were to have far-reaching effects
on later Board decisions concerning the future of decision bargaining:
Illinois Coil Spring Co. (Milwaukee Spring)' 03 and United Technologies v. NLRB
(Otis Elevator).'0 4 The Board initially decided both cases shortly after the
First National Maintenance decision. Both cases were appealed to United
States circuit courts and remanded for reconsideration in light of the First
National Maintenance decision. In both cases the Board initially found a
duty to decision bargain over operational changes. During the period
between the initial decision and the remand, however, the Board's com-
position changed. Three of the four Board members were recent ap-
pointees of President Reagan and one seat had become vacant, subject to
later appointment by Reagan. 105 Upon remand, the initial findings of a
duty to decision bargain were reversed. These two decisions were
among several decisions that signalled significant policy reversals by the
reconstituted Board.' °6
In the first decision, Milwaukee Spring I, the employer had transferred
work from a union plant to a nonunion plant where labor costs would be
lower. Consequently, employees at the union plant were laid off. The
issue in the case was whether the employer's transfer of work constituted
a modification of the bargaining agreement so as to require union con-
sent for the transfer. The Board initially found that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice by deciding to transfer operations be-
cause of higher labor costs under the contract without the union's con-
sent.'0 7 The employer appealed to the Seventh Circuit and the court
remanded the case to the Board for reconsideration in light of First Na-
tional Maintenance.'08 The Board in Milwaukee Spring II reversed the
Board's prior holding in Milwaukee Spring I by finding that the transfer
did not constitute a modification of the contract, and, therefore, did not
require union consent. In its opinion, the Board acknowledged the First
National Maintenance decision, but it noted:
The parties' stipulation and the manner in which they briefed this case
treat Respondent's relocation decision as a mandatory subject of bar-
gaining .... Based on the facts before us ... [w]e do not find it
necessary to decide whether the work relocation here was a mandatory
subject of bargaining under the Supreme Court's decision in First Na-
tional Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB.10
103 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (1984), af'd, 765 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(Milwaukee Spri,g- II), rezg 265 N.L.R.B. 206, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1486 (1982) (ilonautkee Spring I).
104 269 N.L.R.B. 891, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984) (Otis Elevator II), revig atd remanrtding 255
N.L.R.B. 235 (1981) (Otis Elevator I).
105 At the time that these two cases were remanded, the Board was composed of three officials
appointed by President Reagan, Chairman Dotson, Robert Hunter and Patricia Diaz Dennis, and one
appointed by President Carter, Don Zimmerman. The seat vacated by Howard Jenkins, Jr. had not
been filled at that time.
106 See Our Way, Inc., 268 N.I,.R.B. 394 (1983); Olin Corp., 268 N.L,.R.B. 473 (1984); Meyers
Indus., Inc., 268 N.I..R.B. 493 (1984). See also Labor Board Stirs Up a Storm, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1984,
at F-4.
107 .ilwanukee Spring 1, 265 N.I..R.B. 206, 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1486 (1982).
108 See .ilvautlkee Sprig II, 268 N.L.R.B. 601, 115 I..R.R.M. 1065 (BNA) (1984).
109 Id. at n.5, 115 I,.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1066 n.5.
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The Board reached the issue of a duty to decision bargain in Otis
Elevator. United Technologies acquired Otis Elevator in 1975 and pro-
ceeded to analyze its operations and technological development. On the
basis of its analysis, it decided to transfer work from two New Jersey
plants to a newer, more technologically advanced plant in Connecticut.
In doing so, it did not bargain over its decision nor the effects of the
decision, and it refused to give the union any information regarding the
decision. The Board in Otis Elevator I found that the employer engaged
in an unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain over the decision and its
effects and for refusing to provide the union with the requested informa-
tion. °0 Upon reconsideration in light of First National Maintenance all
four Board members participating in the Otis Elevator II decision found
that the employer's decision to transfer and consolidate work to a tech-
nologically more advanced plant was not a mandatory subject of decision
bargaining. T' Three analyses were set forth in support of the Board's
decision.
The plurality opinion, written by Chairman Dotson and Member
Hunter, argued that the employer's decision to discontinue its research
and development activities in NewJersey and move them to its operation
in Connecticut constituted "a change in the nature and direction of a
significant facet of its business."' 12 As such it: was within the core of en-
trepreneurial prerogatives outside the scope of section 8(d) of the
NLRA, and did not give rise to a duty to decision bargain." 3 In review-
ing the facts of the case, the Board pointed out that United Technologies
had undertaken several formal studies of Otis' engineering organization
and technological development. The studies had concluded that Otis'
technological development was outdated, its products too expensive and
thus not competitive, and that its share of the market had been steadily
declining. In light of the evaluations of the state of Otis' technological
development, the company decided to move the research and develop-
ment work from Otis' outdated plants in New Jersey to its more techno-
logically developed plant in Connecticut. At the same time, a new
research and development center was also constructed in Connecticut.' 14
After reviewing these facts, the Board plurality opinion concluded that
the company's action turned on a desire to improve research and devel-
opment and marketability-issues relating to the nature and direction of
its business-and did not turn on labor costs; therefore, no mandatory
duty to decision bargain arose. In so finding, the Board stated:
Despite the evident effect on employees, the critical factor to a deter-
mination whether the decision is subject to mandatory bargaining is
the essence of the decision itself, i.e., whether it turns upon a change in
the nature or direction of the business, or turns upon labor costs; )lot
its effect on employees nor a union's ability to offer alternatives.] 15
110 Oi..X Elevator I, 255 N.I..R.B. 235 (1981).
111 0iS Elevator II, 269 N.1..R.B. 891 15 I..R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (1984).
112 Id., 115 I..R.R.M. (NA), al 1283.
113 11.
114 Id., 115 I.R.R.M. (13N\), at 1281-82.
115 Id. at 89)2, 115 IL.R.R.M. (NA). at 1282-831.
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The opinion acknowledged that labor costs are frequently one of the
considerations that result in a decision to change the nature or direction
of a business. However, the opinion concluded that when labor costs are
one of several factors influencing the decision, they are insufficient to put
the decision within section 8(d)'s duty to bargain, citing First National
Maintenance's proposition that management always has the incentive to
confer voluntarily in that type of situation." 6
Both Members Dennis and Zimmerman concurred in the result
reached by the Board, but each wrote a separate opinion setting forth a
second and third analysis in support of the result. Member Zimmerman
agreed with the plurality opinion that a duty to decision bargain exists
when the decision is based strictly on labor costs. Zimmerman, however,
demonstrated a willingness to extend the duty further than the plurality
opinion. Zimmerman advocated that a duty to bargain be extended to
include decisions based on overall enterprise costs not limited strictly to
labor costs, but which labor concessions could substantially mitigate, ab-
sent any showing by the employer of a need for speed, flexibility or se-
crecy.' 7 Zimmerman then applied that reasoning to the facts of the case
and concluded that the employer's concerns in Otis Elevator II could not
have been resolved through collective bargaining, arguing that the union
could not have made any concessions that would have altered the em-
ployer's concerns."8
In her concurring opinion, Member Dennis 'focussed on manage-
ment decisions such as plant relocations, consolidations, automation,
and subcontracting-decisions that "have a direct impact on employ-
ment, but have as their focus only the economic profitability of the em-
ployer's operation."' g Dennis proposed a two-step test to determine
whether those types of decisions give rise to a duty to decision bargain.
Dennis' first step was to determine whether the employer's action was
"amenable to resolution through the bargaining process,"l 20 i.e.,
whether a factor within the union's control is a consideration in the em-
ployer's decision. If the union has no control over any factors on which
the decision is based, or if the factors over which the union has control
are only insignificant to the decision, the analysis ends, and no duty to
bargain arises. If the union can make concessions or is in a position to
lend assistance that could make a difference in the employer's decision,
then the test moves into its second step, a balancing of that consideration
(amenability to resolution through bargaining) against the burden placed
on management by having to bargain. Dennis invoked the balancing test
set forth in First National Maintenance and concluded that if it is deter-
mined that the decision is amenable to resolution by bargaining, bargain-
ing is required "only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and
the collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the
116 Id. at 893, 115 I..R.R.M. (BNA), at 1284.
117 Id., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1284-85 (Zimmerman, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
118 Id.
119 Id. at 897, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1286-87 (Dennis, J., concurring).
120 Id., 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1288 (quoting First Natl IMa intenance, 452 U.S. at 678).
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conduct of business."' 2 ' Dennis proposed that the factors to be consid-
ered in assessing the degree of burden to the employer should include
the following: Extent of capital commitment; extent of changes in opera-
tions; need for speed; need for flexibility; and, need for confidential-
ity." 22 Applying the test to the facts in Otis Elevator II, Dennis determined
that considerations underlying the company's decision included: Out-
dated technology; noncompetitive product designs; duplicative engineer-
ing activity; outdated and inadequate facilities; and, a superior research
facility in Connecticut. Dennis concluded that the union could not have
made any concessions concerning those factors that could have affected
the employer's decision to relocate and consolidate, and thus the deci-
sion failed to pass the first step in the test. She went on to state that even
if the first step had been passed, the burden factors, i.e., the company's
substantial capital investment and its significant change in its operations,
were too substantial for the decision to have passed the second step.'2 3
The Board has addressed the issue of decision bargaining in a
number of cases since its Otis Elevator decision. In nearly every case, the
Board applied the Otis Elevator plurality opinion to determine whether a
duty to decision bargain existed, and consistently found that the decision
in question involved a significant change in the nature and direction of
the employer's business so that no duty to bargain arose.
In Columbia City Freight Lines, Inc.,124 the Board found that an em-
ployer's decision to close two terminals, lay off unit employees, and
transfer the work to its main terminal significantly changed the nature
and direction of its business, and, therefore, was not a mandatory subject
of decision bargaining. In so finding, the Board determined that the em-
ployer was reacting to the loss of a major customer. As a result of the
loss, it sought to reduce all costs (including but not limited to labor
costs), eliminate duplication in costs and services, and maximize its usage
of equipment and fuel.' 2 5
In Fraser Shipyards, Inc. ,26 an employer decided to close its machine
shop and to subcontract machine work as a result of a general decline in
shipping on the Great Lakes, a slim work schedule through the winter,
and the prohibitive cost of modernizing its shop and repairing and re-
placing machinery. Again, the Board found that the decision fundamen-
tally changed the nature and direction of the employer's business, and
thus did not give rise to a duty to bargain. 27
The Board used the same reasoning over the next several months to
find employers' decisions were not subject to'a duty to decision bargain.
In Bostrom Division, UOP, Inc. ,28 the employer, a manufacturer of seats
for trucks and heavy equipment, decided to close two of its four plants,
121 Id. (quoting First Nalt'l Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 679) (emphasis in original).
122 id.
123 Id. at 900, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1290.
124 271 N.L.R.B. 12, 116 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1311 (1984).
125 Id. at 13, 116 ..R.R.M. (BNA), at 1312.
126 272 N.L.R.B. 496, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1328 (1984).
127 Id. at 497, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1330.
128 272 N.L.R.B. 999, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1429 (1984).
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consolidate operations at the two remaining plants and subcontract cer-
tain operations. The Board determined that the employer was respond-
ing to the deteriorating quality of its product caused by obsolete
equipment, and was attempting to restore the economic viability of its
business by reducing operating costs and eliminating duplication of cost,
work, and service.' 29 The Board came to a similar decision in The Kroger
Co.,'30 where the employer determined that its "nest run" egg process-
ing facility was outmoded, raw materials were scarce, and it was unable to
compete with integrated egg producers, and subsequently decided to
close its egg processing facility. 13 1 Finally, in Gar Wood-Detroit Truck
Equipment, Inc.,132 the employer decided to subcontract the work of
mounting and servicing equipment on trucks, and limit its business to
parts distribution. The Board determined that the employer's essential
purpose in subcontracting was to reduce overhead costs across the board
so that it could remain in business. The subcontracting resulted in pay-
roll costs savings, but it also covered the gamut of overhead costs, thus
affording the employer a wide range of financial relief.' 33
There are two exceptions to the Board's trend of finding no duty to
decision bargain. In Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc. ,34 the Board found that
the employer committed an unfair labor practice by failing to bargain
over its decision to lay off employees, shut down its truck terminal, and
transfer its operations to New Jersey. In so finding, the Board deter-
mined, however, that First National Maintenance and Otis Elevator did not
apply to this case, because the employer made the decisions due to anti-
union animus.' 3 5
Member Dennis wrote the Board's opinion in Pennsylvania Energy
Corp. ,'36 applying her two-step test to find that the employer had a duty
to bargain over its decision to lay off all employees from its strip-mining
operation and subcontract work of stripping and backfilling. Dennis first
determined that the decision to subcontract was based in significant part
on labor costs, a factor over which labor had control, and as such was
amenable to resolution through the collective bargaining process. Den-
nis then determined that the subcontracting decision was amenable to
resolution through bargaining without a significant burden being placed
upon the employer, i.e., the benefit for the collective bargaining process
outweighed the burden placed on business.' 37
The sweeping rule advanced through the Otis Elevator decision, i.e.,
decisions turning on labor costs give rise to a duty to decision bargain
while those turning on changes in the nature and scope of operations do
not, has not been reviewed by the appellate courts. Only one appellate
129 Id. at 1000, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1430.
130 273 N.L.R.B. 462, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1172 (1984).
131 Id. at 463, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1173.
132 274 N.L.R.B. 23, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1417 (1985).
133 Id., 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1419.
134 Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc. and Bari Leasing, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 427, 117 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1369 (1984).
135 Id., 117 I.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1371.
136 274 N.L.R.B. 174, 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1042 (1985).
137 Id., 119 L.R.R.M. (BNA), at 1042.
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case decided since First National Maintenance has addressed the issue of
decision bargaining. In 1983, the Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Island Ty-
pographers, Inc. ,13 squarely raised the question of whether the introduc-
tion of technological change is a mandatory subject of decision
bargaining in light of the First National Maintenance decision; however,
although it raised the question, it failed to resolve it.
Island Typographers, another printing industry case, involved a deci-
sion to change from the hot type typesetting method to the more ad-
vanced cold type method. The Board had found that the employer had
committed an unfair labor practice by unilaterally deciding to introduce
the new technology and laying off union members as a result without
giving the union notice and an opportunity to bargain.' 39 Reversing the
Board's decision, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
union had notice of the employer's plans to change its methods and had
waived its right to bargain over both the decision to introduce the tech-
nology and its resulting effects.' 40 Since the court found that the union
had waived its bargaining rights, it did not address the question of
whether the decision in this case was a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The court did note in a footnote, however, that:
The courts have drawn a distinction between the employer's duty
to bargain over a particular business decision that affects unit employees
and the duty to bargain over the decision's effects on unit employees ....
Although the courts have generally held that the effect of technologi-
cal innovation on employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining ...
they have not yet decided the appropriate treatment to accord the em-
ployer's decision to innovate. 1
In that same footnote, the court posited that the Supreme Court's bal-
ancing test devised in First National Maintenance applies to decisions to
update plant technology: "Thus, ordinarily this Court would rely on the
balancing test to determine whether Island violated section 8(a)(5) of the
Act. However, as we conclude that the union waived its right to bargain
over the decision to update this plant, we need not engage in the First
National Maintenance analysis." 142
If other appellate courts adopt the Second Circuit's position that
First National Maintenance should be broadly construed, and if the courts
adopt the application of the balancing test advanced in Otis Elevator, the
duty to decision bargain will probably not fare any better in the courts
than it has fared under the current Board.
C. Critical Evaluation of the Law Bearing on Technology Bargaining
The First National Maintenance decision, as applied so far by the
Board, established a restrictive model of collective bargaining. As dis-
cussed in the previous section, the Board has broadly construed that
138 705 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1983).
139 Island Typographers, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 3, 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1455 (1980), riv'd, 705 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1983).
140 NI.RB v. Island Typographers, Inc., 705 F.2d 44. 50 (2d Cir. 1983).




holding, and applied it to preclude mandatory bargaining over those de-
cisions made by an employer that do not turn strictly on labor costs. The
current trend in Board and court decisions to restrict the scope of
mandatory decision bargaining is based upon several assumptions con-
cerning the role of labor and the role of the Board and courts in the
collective bargaining process. This section will critically examine this re-
strictive model of collective bargaining and the assumptions on which it
is based.
In addition, this section will contrast the different positions that the
Board and courts have taken regarding duty to bargain over decisions
concerning employee health and safety as opposed to the duty to bargain
over decisions concerning employment conditions and security, not in-
volving health and safety. As discussed in the previous section, when an
employer's decision involves employee health and safety, the Board and
courts have found a mandatory duty to bargain over the decision itself.
However, when an employer's decision concerns other employment corn-
ditions and security, not involving health and safety, but which may im-
pact on the lives of employees just as significantly, the Board and courts
have not found a mandatory duty to decision bargain. This section will
compare those seemingly incongruous positions.
1. Evaluation of First National Maintenance Restrictive Bargaining
Model
a. The Restrictive Model of Bargaining and the NLRA
The restrictive model of collective bargaining established by the
Supreme Court in First National Maintenance precludes any participation
by employees in vastly important decisions that concern their welfare in
the workplace. The exemption of employee participation in manage-
ment decision making fundamentally conflicts with Congressional intent
regarding the role of labor and collective bargaining in labor-manage-
ment relations.
As discussed above, the legislative history of the NLRA indicates that
Congress intended that the collective bargaining process be dynamic and
capable of changing to meet new problems that might arise in labor-man-
agement relations.l4 3 Congress envisioned a positive role for labor in
the collective bargaining process, and saw collective bargaining as a co-
operative effort between labor and management. Enforced bargaining
lies at the heart of the NLRA. Section 7 of the NLRA established the
employees' right to organize for collective bargaining. 44 Section 8 pro-
tected that right by establishing numerous employer unfair labor prac-
tices.'45 Section 8(a)(5), which makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to refuse to bargain collectively, is perhaps the most significant
protection afforded the employees' right to organize. The right to or-
ganize and its attendant protections would be form without substance if
an employer were not required to make a genuine effort to meet and
143 See supra text accompanying notes 13-20.
144 29 U.S.(C. § 157 (1982).
145 d. § 158.
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reach agreement with the representatives of the employees over matters
that significantly affect employee welfare, and often concern the contin-
ued existence of employees in the workplace.
The legislative history concerning the adoption of the language in
section 8(d), "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment," also indicates that collective bargaining was intended to be ex-
pansive in scope. This provides further evidence that a restrictive model
of bargaining is inappropriate. As noted previously in this Article, Con-
gress deliberately rejected an attempt to restrict the scope of bargaining
to a specific list of subjects. 14 6 Except for health and safety, the Supreme
Court and the Board, however, have consistently restricted the scope of
bargaining to those decisions over which labor could exert any influence.
First National Maintenance and recent Board decisions abandon the
goal of industrial self-government set forth in the NLRA. Those opin-
ions require the employer to bargain only over the details of implement-
ing its decisions, and do not require the employer to consider, during its
decision making process, any input from those most affected by its deci-
sions. In his majority opinion in First National Maintenance, Blackmun ac-
knowledged the NLRA goal of industrial self-government:
The aim of labeling a matter a mandatory subject of bargaining, rather
than simply permitting, but not requiring, bargaining, is to "promote
the fundamental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern
to labor and management within the framework established by Congress as most
conducive to industrial peace."' 4 7
Blackmun then formulated a "balancing test", whereby a duty to bargain
over the decision will be said to exist if the "benefit for labor-manage-
ment relations and the collective-bargaining process, outweighs the bur-
den placed on the conduct of the business."' 4 8 Although the balancing
test per s.e is consistent with the goal of industrial self-government, the
Court's application of the test in First National Maintenance and the test's
subsequent interpretation by the Board does not promote industrial self-
government. The Court substantially diminished the value of labor's in-
terest in and potential contribution to the decision making process, while
enhancing the value of management's interest. The overriding consider-
ation when applying the balancing test became management's need to be
as free as possible from the constraints of bargaining in order to run a
profitable business. The language in section 8(a)(5), setting forth the
duty to bargain, is unqualified. It does not restrict the duty to bargain to
decisions that are of little consequence to employer nor to decisions that
turn strictly on labor costs. The Supreme Court and the Board, however,
have effectively qualified the meaning of section 8(a)(5) to mean just that.
In order to meet the Congressional goal of industrial self-government,
collective bargaining must effectively address the needs of both labor and
146 See supra text accompanying note 17.
147 452 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Fibreboard Paper Prods., 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964)) (emphasis ad-
ded) (citations omitted).
148 Id. at 679.
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management by channelling all issues of major concern to both parties
through the procedures of enforced negotiation.
b. Evaluation of First National Maintenance Economic Analysis and
Assumptions
The Supreme Court and the Board justify their restriction of the
scope of bargaining by speculating over the merits of collective bargain-
ing. The Court and Board decisions assume that collective bargaining is
unlikely to alter management's economic behavior, and that it is ineffi-
cient and necessarily a burden on the employer. Blackmun objected pri-
marily to enforced bargaining at the decision making stage on the
grounds that it would distort management's economically rational deci-
sion making process.' 4 9 The majority believed that management had the
incentive to bargain voluntarily with labor at the decision making stage
when the decision turned on labor costs, and it is then in their best eco-
nomic interest to bargain to obtain labor concessions. If the decision did
not turn on labor costs, management had no incentive to bargain in
which case enforced decision bargaining would be a futile exercise, re-
sulting only in delay. The Court believed that labor's practical goal in
decision bargaining was to pressure management by such a delay. Hav-
ing eliminated any benefit from the decision bargaining process, the ma-
jority concluded that the costs to management of decision bargaining
outweighed any benefit from the process, and that labor's interests would
be adequately represented and protected through effects bargaining.
The Supreme Court's analysis concerning the effectiveness of collec-
tive bargaining is based on the majority opinion in Fibreboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. v. NLRB.150 The company in Fibreboard, concerned about the
cost of its maintenance operation, unilaterally decided to "contract out"
maintenance work done by bargaining unit employees. As a result of the
decision, the company terminated bargaining unit employees. The
Supreme Court held that the economic decision to replace employees in
the existing bargaining unit with employees of an independent contrac-
tor to do the same work under similar conditions of employment was a
mandatory subject of bargaining.' 5 ' In reaching that decision, the Court
had concluded that the phrase "terms and conditions of employment"
covered termination of employment.' 5 2 The Court supported its deci-
sion in several ways. It first considered the legislative history of the
NLRA, and observed:
The inclusion of "contracting out" within the statutory scope of col-
lective bargaining also seems well designed to effectuate the purposes
of the National Labor Relations Act. One of the primary purposes of
the Act is to promote the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes by
subjecting labor-management controversies to the mediatory influ-
ence of negotiation. The Act was framed with an awareness that refus-
als to confer and negotiate had been one of the most prolific causes of
149 Id. at 682-83.
150 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
151 Id. at 209.
152 Id. at 210.
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industrial strife .... To hold, as the Board has done, that contracting
out is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining would promote the
fundamental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of vital concern
to labor and management within the framework established by Con-
gress as most conducive to industrial peace.' 5 3
The Court also considered current industrial practices:
Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of labor and
management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the amenabil-
ity of such subjects to the collective bargaining process. Experience illustrates
that contracting out in one form or another has been brought, widely
and successfully, within the collective bargaining framework.l 54
Finally, the Court considered the interests of the parties in the case,
and assessed whether that particular dispute was capable of being re-
solved through collective bargaining. In doing so, it found that
mandatory decision bargaining would not have interfered with the em-
ployer's freedom to manage the business, noting that the decision
neither involved an alteration of the employer's basic operation nor any
capital investment. The Court also found that since the decision in-
volved the high cost of labor in the maintenance operation, there was a
good chance that a satisfactory solution to the problem could be reached
through mandatory negotiation.l5 5 The Court concluded its analysis by
limiting the decision explicitly to the facts of the case.' 5 6 Although the
Fibreboard majority appeared to favor a less restrictive model of collective
bargaining than the First National Maintenance majority did, the Fibreboard
opinion contributed to the adoption of a limited analysis by considering a
relevant factor to be the amenability of the subcontracting issue to reso-
lution through collective bargaining.
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion in Fibreboard, rejected an ex-
pansive interpretation of collective bargaining, and advanced a test to
determine whether a decision should be a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. Stewart argued:
Nothing the Court holds today should be understood as imposing a
duty to bargain collectively regarding such managerial decisions,
which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions concerning
the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enter-
prise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of employment,
though the effect of the decision may be necessarily to terminate
employment. 157
Stewart's concurrence has influenced restrictive interpretations of the
scope of decision bargaining. The First National Maintenance majority
adopted Stewart's "capital investment test" to support its position that
every decision resulting in unemployment should not necessarily be a
mandatory subject of bargaining. 15 8
153 Id. at 210-11.
154 Id. at 211 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
155 Id. at 213-14.
156 Id. at 215.
157 Id. at 223 (Stewart, J., concurring).
158 First .\ait7 Mainit anrtce, 452 U.S. at 677.
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The Fibreboard Court legitimates an analysis that requires a showing
of the effectiveness of bargaining before finding a duty to bargain. The
requirement of a showing of effectiveness is incompatible with the notion
of equality of bargaining power, a concept that is at the heart of the col-
lective bargaining process. Collective bargaining presumes that both
parties, labor and management, will meet as equals, and that employees
through their representatives will have an opportunity to influence their
employer's economic behavior.' 59 The Supreme Court's analysis, which
purports to prejudge the outcome of the bargaining process, denies em-
ployees that opportunity. Such judicial intervention into the outcome of
the bargaining process is unwarranted in light of Congressional intent
that the process be a cooperative effort between labor and management.
If the duty to decision bargain is mandated only when the Board or
courts determine first that labor is capable of influencing the employer's
decision, and, secondly, that labor's participation will not affect the scope
or direction of the employer's business, labor will be deprived of the op-
portunity to contribute to an employer's decisions to improve economic
efficiency or business output and thus labor's interests will not be equally
represented in the decision making process.
When the Supreme Court and Board have conducted analyses in re-
cent decisions concerning the effectiveness of collective bargaining, they
have attempted to prove that collective bargaining would be fiutile, or
that costs of delay and uncertainty would endanger the employer's finan-
cial position. Implicit in the projections of futility and cost is a negative
view of the value of collective bargaining. When Congress established
the collective bargaining process, it relied on an optimistic assessment of
the process, based on beneficial effects of mandatory negotiations. The
Supreme Court and the Board have failed to consider adequately collec-
tive bargaining's beneficial effects. Bargaining results in a flow of infor-
mation between the parties which clarifies issues and reduces any
apparent arbitrariness on the employer's part. Affording labor the op-
portunity to participate in the decision making process thus diffuses
blame for decisions that have an adverse effect on labor. In that sense,
even bargaining that does not successfully resolve disputes is valuable
(and not futile), because it contributes to the Congressional goal of in-
dustrial stability.'6 0 Successful resolution of disputes is particularly valu-
able for its potential to produce resolutions that neither party perceived
prior to negotiation, or that the parties were not ready to meet prior to
negotiation. Whatever the outcome of the negotiations, the societal ben-
efit of collective bargaining is great, because institutionalized participa-
tion neutralizes labor relations.' 6 '
As discussed above, the Court in First National Maintenance believed
that enforced negotiation would be futile unless the employer's decision
turned solely on labor costs, and thus labor's sole motive in bargaining
159 See supra text accompanying notes 13-16.
160 See Walton, From Control to Commitment inl the forkplace, HARV. BTus. REX'., March-April 1985, at
77.
161 For a brief discussion of labor participation in management decision making and attendant
costs and benefits, see ifra text accompanying notes 191-215.
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over a decision concerning external or third-party economic factors
would be to delay the employer's decision.' 62 This belief is based upon
an economic view of labor and capital that modern economists have
largely abandoned. Early economists viewed labor and capital as two in-
dependent variables.' 63 Early economic theory assumed that the return
on fixed capital determined the economic efficiency of the enterprise,
and that efficient management would strive to achieve a profit maximiz-
ing level of fixed capital. That theory viewed labor as a beneficiary of
management's efforts since a greater return on fixed capital resulted in a
greater demand for working capital (labor). Consequently, labor's role
was limited to bargaining over decisions concerning working capital.' 64
Economists today have adopted a more complex theory which views
capital and labor as interdependent factors that must be considered si-
multaneously in order to determine the most profitable and viable com-
bination of the two factors. One purpose of collective bargaining is to
define the relationship between labor and capital, and, once defined, to
determine the viability of changing the relationship. The futility of bar-
gaining cannot be ascertained conclusively until the parties have met and
attempted to negotiate their positions. Information transfer and an ex-
change of views can inform and persuade. Bargaining need not always
require a trade-off among interests. Once the bargaining process has be-
gun, labor's ability to contribute meaningfully to the decision making
process should be readily apparent, as should any intransigence on la-
bor's part, thereby dispelling the First National Maintenance Court's con-
cern regarding labor's motive to delay the decision. Also, the more
accustomed that management becomes to involving labor in early stages
of its decision making process, the less likely it is to experience lengthy
delays.
The Court in First National Maintenance expressed concern that cer-
tain aspects of mandatory decision bargaining would endanger the em-
ployer's financial position. The Court cited an employer's need for
"speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and ex-
igencies."' 65 Most decisions concerning operational changes, such as
the introduction of technological change, are not made in an emergency
situation requiring "speed, flexibility, and secrecy."' 6" The Court also
cited the risk of economic damage to the business posed by publicity inci-
dent to the bargaining process. 67 Risks incident to publicity, however,
already exist since labor must receive notice and an opportunity to bar-
162 See spra text accompanying notes 77-82.
163 See, e.g., J. MILL, POLITICAL ECONOMY 328-45 (1900) (Ist ed. London 1848). Mill initially
viewed capital and labor as distinctly separate classes, with wages paid from a fund determined by
and in proportion to the level of capital. Mill eventually abandoned this view. See Ml. DOBB, TuIEO-
RIES OF VAI.E AND DISTRIBUTION SINCE ADAM SMITH 133-34 (1976).
164 Se Comment, "Partial Termilatiois" -. 1 Choice Betweein Bagainiig Equaliv antd Ecolomic EfficiecV,
14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1089, 1090-97 (1967), which was cited by the Supreme Court in First Nat1'l
.llaintellantce when it reasoned that an employer might have no alternative to closing. 452 U.S. at 683
n.21.
165 452 U.S. at 682. See slpra text accompanying note 81.
166 See spra text accompanying notes 90-93 for Brennan's dissent. See also Ashford, Avers &
Stone, 'silg Regulatiol to Change the Mlarket for Iiiilovatio, 9 HA.\R. ENTI.. L. RE. 420-28 (1985).





gain effectively prior to implementation of the decision. The employer
can diminish costs if it plans ahead to incorporate labor's participation
into its decision making process. The NLRA established a process of ne-
gotiation and agreement through which the relationship between labor
and management could be developed. Under the collective bargaining
process, the employer is relieved of direct regulation of labor-manage-
ment relations, and is allowed to retain final control over economic deci-
sions. There are costs to the employer as well as to labor that are
incident to the bargaining process. Congress, however, determined that
the societal benefits of mandatory negotiations outweigh those costs to
individual parties.' 68
The First National Maintenance majority believed that an employer al-
ways has an incentive to decision bargain voluntarily with labor if the
employer perceives that concessions or contributions by labor may con-
tribute to the profitability of the business. 169 The possibility of voluntary
negotiations does not adequately substitute for mandatory bargainihg.
In NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp.,'70 the Supreme Court
determined that mandatory collective bargaining, with all of its proce-
dural indicia of good faith, is necessarily more effective than permissive
collective bargaining. Unlike mandatory bargaining, permissive bargain-
ing does not afford labor the right to insist on receiving the information,
time and good faith consideration that it may require to contribute ac-
ceptable alternatives to the employer's decision. In a permissive bargain-
ing situation, an employer is likely to be less receptive to labor input, and
therefore less likely to change a decision that is already made. Not only
is labor deprived of a meaningful opportunity to participate in the deci-
sion making process, but the employer may be deprived as well of mean-
ingful contributions by labor.
In its economic analysis in First National Maintenance, the Supreme
Court skewed the benefits and burdens inherent in the collective bar-
gaining process in favor of management to find no duty to decision bar-
gain. The Court's interpretation of the costs and benefits reflects a fear
that imposing a duty to decision bargain will interject labor too exten-
sively into corporate decision making. That fear also has driven the
Supreme Court to distinguish rigidly between decision and effects bar-
gaining, and thus depart from the earlier interpretation of effects
bargaining.
The Supreme Court in First National Maintenance held that an em-
ployer's economically motivated decision to close a portion of its opera-
tion is not a mandatory subject of bargaining. The Court, however, also
found that the employer does have a duty to bargain over the effects of the
decision. In so holding, the Court stated: "There is no dispute that the
union must be given a significant opportunity to bargain about these mat-
ters of job security as part of the 'effects' bargaining .... [B]argaining
over the effects of a decision must be conducted in a meaningful manner
168 See spra text accompanying notes 19-20.
169 See supra text accompanying note 82.
170 356 U.S. 342 (1957).
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and at a meaningful time ... ."171 The Court did not specify what it consid-
ered to be a "significant opportunity" to bargain nor did it specify what
constitutes a "meaningful manner" or a "meaningful time."
As noted above, earlier court and Board decisions concerning the
distinction between "decision" and "effects" bargaining interpreted ef-
fects bargaining as requiring bargaining during the period after the deci-
sion is made but prior to implementation of the decision, rather than after
implementation of the decision. This would imply that effects bargaining
should occur before the employer has committed himself to his decision
to the extent that the decision is irrevocable, i.e., effects bargaining
should provide labor with an opportunity to influence an employer's delib-
erations prior to his having arrived at the decision. 172
In First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court described effects
bargaining in a way that rigidly distinguished it from decision bargaining,
and thereby deprived management of any positive input by labor in its
decision making process. That decision was based on an economic analy-
sis that assumes that labor is incapable of influencing an employer's deci-
sion unless the decision turns on labor costs, and that even if labor were
capable of making positive contributions to the decision making process,
such participation is undesirable because of management's overriding
need for "speed, flexibility, and secrecy."'7 3 The Court did not explicitly
deny labor an opportunity to influence management, nor did it interpret
effects bargaining as attaching after implementation of the decision.
However, because of this economic analysis the effective result of the
First National Maintenance opinion appears to deny labor any opportunity
171 First \at'l aizntenance, 452 U.S. at 681-82 (emphasis added).
172 One commentator has argued that when effects bargaining is interpreted as attaching before
an employer commits irrevocably to a decision, there is virtually no practical difference between it
and decision bargaining. The commentator argues that both decision and effects bargaining have
essentially identical goals: To give labor notice sufficiently in advance of the implementation of a
decision to provide it the opportunity, through bargaining, to protect the interests of employees. In
addition, in both cases, the union has the right to information within the employer's control which
the union needs to bargain intelligently. Finally, both duties attach sufficiently in advance of imple-
mertation of the decision to provide labor with a meaningful opportunity to bargain. The commen-
tator views the differences between the two duties as being differences of degree. In decision
bargaining, labor has an opportunity to offer the employer alternatives during the deliberative stage
and thereby attempt to influence the employer's decision. Similarly, in effects bargaining, although
labor's focus is on ways to ameliorate the adverse impact of the employer's decision on the employ-
ees, the duty attaches prior to the time when the decision becomes irrevocable so that labor may
influence the decision even during effects bargaining. The commentator concludes that because the
distinction that has been drawn by the courts between decision and effects bargaining is an illusory
one, the impact of the First .\'ational laitenance decision may not be substantial. Kohler, supra note
31, at 416-21. This Article suggests that Kohler is optimistic in his assessment of what impact the
First .Valional .llaitenace decision might have.
In support of this interpretation, Kohler explains that early Board and court cases discussed the
duty to bargain in general terms and assumed that the duty would attach before the decision became
irrevocable, thereby affording labor an opportunity to suggest a concession, modification or alterna-
tive approach that might obviate the need or desire to make the planned change. Kohler continues
to explain that the Board began to divide the employer's duty to bargain into two distinct duities to
decision- and effects-bargain in Fibreboard 1, 130 N.L.R.B. 1558 (1961), apparently in an effort to
shield employers from labor influence over decisions concerning the use and management of labor's
economic resources. Finally, Kohler maintains that although cases decided since Fibreboard I indicate
that clIects bargaining may occur after an employer is committed to the execution of its decision, in
reality, there is no way to distinguish the timing. Kohler, spram note 31, at 407-10, 413-18.





to influence an employer's economically motivated decision and to attach
the duty to effects bargain after implementation of the decision--or at
least after the employer has committed himself to the decision.
Management stands to gain far more by labor's participation at a
stage prior to its irrevocable commitment to the decision. Not only may
labor more effectively protect the interests of employees by having a
"meaningful opportunity" to influence an employer's decision either at
the deliberative stage or prior to implementation, but the employer may
also benefit from labor's input at an earlier time. A "meaningful oppor-
tunity" to bargain should be interpreted as an opportunity to bargain
over the decision and its anticipated attendant effects. The distinctions which
the courts have attempted to draw between decision and effects bargain-
ing represent an attempt to separate the management prerogatives of the
employer from the rights statutorily guaranteed to workers into isolated
spheres. The distinctions also reflect fear that labor may intrude too ex-
tensively into corporate decision making. As the commentator discussed
above points out, "decision bargaining is no more than an industrial ver-
sion of due process." 74 The duty to bargain over a decision and its an-
ticipated attendant effects requires only that an employer notify labor of
its plan to institute some operational changes, and then entertain in good
faith any alternatives that labor may formulate.
2. Evaluation of Position that Mandates Decision Bargaining Only
Over Health and Safety Issues
It is apparent from the above discussion that few cases deal with the
duty to bargain over technological change per se. The vast majority of
cases stemming from the introduction of technological change focus on
individual problems that arise from the impact of the change, e.g., the
various effects on the bargaining unit such as lay offs or reclassification,
transfers of operations, partial closing, health and safety problems. As
noted above, the complexity of the impact of technological change cou-
pled with the piecemeal fashion in which the Board and courts have ap-
proached the problem has resulted in a confused set of decisions. Those
decisions strongly favor management by limiting the duty to bargain to
the effects of the technological change while according management un-
limited discretion to make decisions regarding the introduction of the
technology.
An important question is whether the presence of a health or safety
issue should be treated any differently in the case of technological
change. The impact of technological change on the health and safety of
the work environment can generally take one of six basic forms:
(1) More hazardous technology introduced with worker displacement;
(2) More hazardous technology introduced with no worker
displacement;
(3) Safer technology introduced with worker displacement;
(4) Safer technology introduced with no worker displacement;
174 Kohlcr, supra note 31, at 414.
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(5) Technology introduced with worker displacement and no effect on
health or safety of the worker;
(6) Technology introduced with no worker displacement and no effect
on health or safety of the worker.
Board and court decisions mandate that an employer has a duty to
bargain over the effects of technological change on labor that result in
any one of those situations; however, after First National Maintenance an
employer would appear to have a duty to bargain over the decision to in-
troduce that change only in those situations in which health and safety
issues are raised. Furthermore, a strong argument can be made that Gulf
Power mandates a duty to bargain over decisions concerning health and
safety, although the case itself is not absolutely clear on that point.' 7 5
However, reading First National Maintenance and Gulf Power together, deci-
sion bargaining over health and safety issues seems to be required, since
most adverse effects on health and safety can only meaningfully be ad-
dressed and mitigated if the decision to adopt technology or change pro-
duction process is reversed or altered. These scenarios will be evaluated
in light of these decisions.
The first scenario of the six listed above is the most compelling, both
from a legal and a policy point of view. The introduction of technology
into the workplace that results both in job losses and in greater hazards
to the remaining workers clearly exerts tremendous impact on the terms
and conditions of employment for those workers involved. The holding
in Gulf Power that health and safety issues are mandatory subjects of bar-
gaining, coupled with the high priority accorded health and safety in the
legislative history of the NLRA, 76 strongly supports the proposition that
considerations of health and safety override management prerogatives,
and, therefore, should be mandatory subjects of bargaining at the decision
making stage. Board and court decisions, however, do not generally man-
date a duty to decision bargain where issues concerning displacement are
involved. Nevertheless, in this first situation, where the health and safety
issues appear to give rise to a duty to decision bargain, the job displace-
ment issues presumably would also be included as subjects of bargaining
at the decision making stage.
Examples of the situation where new technology could result in both
increased hazards and job displacement may help to clarify the point that
this enormous impact on workers compels a duty to decision bargain.
One example of this situation can occur in the chemical industry when a
change is made from a batch process to a closed chemical process under
extremely high pressure. This change in process not only results in a
decreased need for workers, but it also may pose greater dangers in the
workplace in the form of an increased potential for explosions and toxic
leaks. This situation also can occur with the introduction of high-speed
cutting machinery which is used in various industries. This machinery is
not only more efficient and requires less labor, but it can be extremely
175 See supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
176 See 1 IMRA HISTORY, supra note 17, at 158, 166-67.
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dangerous as well. 17 7
This first situation can arise in an office context as well as in the
factory setting. The use of computers and word processors is a prime
example. Computers and word processors are being used with ever in-
creasing frequency in offices throughout the country. As a result, clerical
workers are required to be better trained and more highly skilled, and
certain lower-level clerical positions are being eliminated altogether.'7 8
As time goes on, increased automation in the office may result in nearly
fully automated offices thereby eliminating the need for clerical staff. 79
In addition to the job displacement problems caused by the use of office
automation, the video display terminals (VDTs) found on computers and
word processors are proving to be health hazards as well.'8° Although
some of the studies concerning the hazards of VDTs are as yet inconclu-
sive, those studies do indicate that VDTs result in such problems as se-
vere eye strain, back strain and exposure to low-level radiation emitted
by VDTs, which some responsible scientists have postulated can produce
birth defects and miscarriages in addition to cataracts and skin rashes.'8 '
Although the studies may as yet be inconclusive and the injuries caused
by VDTs may not be the same acute, immediate injuries often associated
with hazards in the factory, they are of no less significance, and thus
should be accorded a high degree of priority in the collective bargaining
process.
The job displacement problems in the examples given above affect
the lives of workers just as substantially as the health and safety
problems. The issues surrounding job displacement, however, generally
appear to be mandatory subjects of decision bargaining only where
health and safety issues are also involved, assuming that one is able to
successfully argue that precedent dictates that considerations of health
and safety are mandatory subjects of decision bargaining.
If one is successful in making that argument, the outcome of the sec-
ond situation, in which more hazardous technology is introduced with no
displacement, will be the same as the outcome in the first situation since
177 Personal communication with Walter Haag, Director of the Division of Physical Sciences and
Engineering, NIOSH-Cincinnati (March 10, 1986).
178 U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, AUTOMATION OF AMERICA'S OFFICES 15-
19, 33-68 (1985) [hereinafter OTA REPORT ON OFFICE AUTOMATION].
179 Not all commentators agree on this prediction. While some economists predict that office
automation will drastically diminish the number of office jobs, other economists predict that the
number of office jobs will continue to grow in spite of increased automation. See OTA REPORT ON
OFFICE AUTOMATION, supra note 178, at 16-17, 37-45.
180 See J. STELL.MAN & M. HENEFIN, OFFICE WORK CAN BE DANGEROUS TO YOUR HEAI.TH 41-70(1983); OTA REPORT ON OFFICE AUTOMATION, supra note 178, at 137-51; U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF
FE(IINOI.OGY ASSESSMENT, REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH HAZARDS IN THE WORKPL.ACE 100-01 (1985) [here-
inafter OTA REPORT ON REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS].
181 See J. STEL.LMAN & M. HENEFIN, supra note 180. Authorities are in disagreement concerning
the extent to which VDT usage adversely affects the health of employees. See OTA REPORT ON OF-
IICE ATOMATION, supra note 178, at 137-51; An-lgina Study Slggests Elevated Risk for I'DT sers, Re-
searcher Tells .eeting, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 624 (Jan. 24, 1985); .o Permanent lnar), to lbor.) Childrel
Posed by 'DT Use, Ogan)izationl States, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 758 (Feb. 28, 1985); Rhode Islnmd Pael
Sees .Vo Danger, .Veed to Regulate, lideo Display Terminals, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 773 (Mar. 7, 1985); CI-I
.\orth Carolina Study Reports I.ink Betweel I'DT l se, .ligina; tges ore Researh, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at
828 (Mar. 28, 1985).
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considerations of health and safety establish the duty to decision bargain
in both situations. An example of the second situation in the factory set-
ting would be the simple substitution of a more toxic substance in the
manufacturing process for another substance. The union would have a
substantial interest in protecting the health and safety of its members by
participating in that decision. An example in the office context would
again be the introduction of automation; however, the focus would be on
the professional workforce rather than the clerical staff. The focus shifts
in this second scenario because the introduction of automation fre-
quently results in less job displacement among the professional staff than
the clerical staff. 8 2 Since the professional staff will be utilizing the auto-
mation, however, they will be exposed to the same hazards as members
of the clerical staff who also use it.
In the third and fourth situations, in which safer technology is intro-
duced rather than more hazardous technology, one cannot rely as clearly
on the high priority accorded health and safety issues as one could in the
first two situations. Nevertheless, even though safer technology is intro-
duced, health and safety could well have been at issue during the deci-
sion making process, in which case management should be obligated to
bargain with labor at the time. An example of a situation where safer
technology is introduced with worker displacement and where health and
safety are at issue in the decision is the introduction of robotics to per-
form hazardous work previously performed by human workers.
Although the use of robots to do hazardous work is admittedly a benefit
to workers in one respect, it can have a negative effect on their lives as
well. The widespread use of robots can result in lay offs and seniority
problems and changes in the composition of the bargaining unit by mak-
ing certain blue-collar jobs obsolete and requiring increased technical
expertise. Compensation issues would be raised where the use of robots
cuts down on the need for overtime and thus directly affects wages.
These are but a few of the myriad ways in which the use of robots can
affect employees, positively and negatively.' 83 One of the purposes of
collective bargaining is to provide workers with an opportunity to partici-
pate in decisions which profoundly affect their lives by proposing alterna-
tive ideas to management. Certainly, this is a situation in which workers
would wish to propose alternatives, and, perhaps, to make concessions to
avoid complete automation of the process by using robots. Workers may
often be even more concerned with job security than with the question of
their own personal health and safety. Workers have had a long tradition
of engaging in hazardous occupations (consider, e.g., coal miners) in or-
der to support their families at the risk of their own lives.'84 That is not
182 See OTA REPORT ON OFFICE AUTOMATION, supra note 178, at 15-19, 45-71.
183 ILeap & Pizzolatto, sipra note 40, at 697. See also Robot Safety Report, Proposed Standard .Now
.-4lvailable foml lIdustry Association, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 693 (Jan. 31, 1985); Steps to Prevent ktyjn of
MIorkers by lndustrial Robots Suggested by NIOSH, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 753 (Feb. 28, 1985); Industrial
Robot Sfety Gulidelines Seen lndusthy Standard 1'itin Two ears, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 410 (Oct. 17,
1985).
184 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON COAL, THE AMERICAN COAL MINER: A REPORT ON COMMUNITY
AND LIVING CONDITIONS IN THE COALFIELDS (1980); R. LINGENFELTER, THE HARDROCK MINERS: A
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to say that management should not accord the highest priority to making
the workplace as safe as possible for workers; rather, where various con-
siderations surrounding health and safety must be weighed against those
of job security, workers should be given a voice in those decisions. Cer-
tainly, if labor is to pay for safer working conditions by losing jobs, it
ought to have any opportunity to suggest job savings and safer techno-
logical alternatives.
A question surrounding the introduction of "safer" technology, re-
gardless of whether it results in worker displacement or not, is whether the
technology really is safer or whether the hazards are latent and as yet unknown.
Management does not always possess complete and perfect information.
Today many labor unions have become very sophisticated in their efforts
to protect the health and safety of workers from hazards inherent in
many technological advances.' 8 5 Often acting in concert with unions in
other industrial markets abroad, American unions are expending sub-
stantial time, money and effort on researching and studying the effects
on workers of exposure to various toxic substances, VDTs and the
like.'8" To assume that management alone possesses all of the informa-
tion necessary to make the most well-informed decisions concerning the
health and safety of workers may be paternalistic and short-sighted. The
use of personal protection equipment, such as hearing protectors or rub-
ber suits, while ostensibly adopted to protect the worker, also can stress
the worker. Unions consistently argue for engineering controls on tech-
nology rather than enclosing the worker in a hot suit or burdening the
worker with devices which impair his movement. 8 7 Even where manage-
ment intends in good faith to introduce safer technology, labor's partici-
pation in the decision making process contributes to a fully informed
decision.
The discussion thus far has focused upon health and safety as a con-
sideration in the decision making process. Even if health and safety is-
sues are not involved in the decision to introduce technological change,
consideration should be given to mandating a duty to bargain over the
decision. Technological change can have an even larger effect on job
security than health and safety. Health and safety affects individual work-
ers, and can possibly affect their later offspring.' ~8 If new technology
results in transfers of operations, partial plant closing or an entire plant
HISTO)RY )OF TIlE MININ(; LABOR NOVEMENT IN TIlE AMERICAN VEST, 1863-1893 (1974); J. W¥II.LIAMS,
IlE Dl)RBYSIIIRE MHINERS (1962).
185 See, e.g. , . B.:ow, BARGA(;.ININ(; FOR JO)1 SAFETY AND HEAI.TII (1(80); .4ngina Slldyv S,.l .b IEle-
i'aled Rl Ki. for I'I)T Users, O.S.H. Rcp. (BNA), at (24 (Jan. 24. 1985) (joint study conduciled 1by the
Public Health Service, the Communication Workers of Amecrican, and the North (arolina (ccupa-
tional Sa t!v and Health Project); I'D) Resolve.s to P'ress Congrevssfor Iaws Proterting I cltimrs q/ 'Ocll(pational
l)i'Seawe, ().S.H. Rep. (NA), at 688 (Jan. 31, 1985); Crlul .\orth Carolina Study Reports Link Between 1')7'
I:e .lgina, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 828 (Mar. 28, 1985); SEll' and 9 to 5 to lIel/, .Illminii.ter Stlldy o
U')D and Pr1eftnan(y Iazards, O.S.H. Rcp). (BNA). a 21 (Juine 13, 985).
186 Id. See also Chamlo(t land D1)yimml, Coo)perationl r (:o) C/lilt: Eur/)op)ean xpernI. ees with 'lchnologiral
Change at the IJi'hkplaue, March, 1981 (publ)lication of the 1)ept. ftr Profl'essional 1iloecs, AFI.-
I()); l't 'I Forum .1do11.s I )T Ba/gaining ;Goal., lhe (;llild Rclportr, (Oflicial Pu'llication of lhe News-
)al)c'r- (;Guild (AFL-C1(), (1,C), Nov. 9, 1984, at , col. 1.
187 See Witt & Early, The Ir Wher a.% Sq/etv Inspector, \()RKIN(; I)AIERS. SCt).-()t. 1980, at 21, 24-25.
188 S O()lA REI'iORT ON RIRi():I)uc-:r [I.vAZ.\S, upr)a note 180.
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closing in a small community, those changes affect the lives of workers,
their families and the entire community. The effect can be devastating in
economic, social and personal terms.' 8 9
Board and court decisions accord high priority to issues of health
and safety; however, technology can affect workers just as significantly in
many other ways. The union can represent the interests and concerns of
the workers involved, and thereby mitigate the impact most effectively
through participation at the decision making stage. As one commentator
ably articulates:
Without full collective bargaining-no matter how enlightened or be-
nevolent management may be-working men and women simply don't
participate in the basic decisions which govern their jobs, their in-
come, and their lives. Collective bargaining is essential to meet the
challenge of technological change with a minimum of social and
human dislocation; . . . to assure workers of dignity on the job and
protection against arbitrary action by management; and to work for
general economic, social and political conditions which enhance
human welfare, human dignity and human freedom.' 9 0
D. Employee Participation in Management Decision Making
Numerous Board and court decisions outlined above, particularly
the First National Maintenance decision, and recent Board decisions since
First National Maintenance deferred to management's perceived need for
unfettered decision making. Implicit in the Court's arguments in First
National Maintenance is the assumption that labor can generally only hin-
der rather than advance the decision making process. The introduction
of technological change into the workplace, however, is rarely done
under compelling conditions requiring speed, flexibility or secrecy. Dif-
fusion of existing technologies (usually tried in other plants) into a par-
ticular workplace, rather than technological innovation, is the norm.l 9 l
189 See B. BLUESTONE AND B. HARRISON, CAPITAL AND COMMUNITIES: THE CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES OF PRIVATE DISINVESTMENT 84-103 (1980). The authors document the multiplier effect on
jobs and income, the disruption of the local business climate, the reduction of the local tax base, and
the destabilization of the community economy. See also Stillman, The Devastating Imrpact of Plaitt Reloca-
tions, in TIIE BIG BUSINESS READER 72 (Green & Massie eds. 1980). Stillman documents that when a
local steel industry closed in Youngstown, Ohio, 5000 jobs were initially lost, and 1 1,199 jobs were
subsequently lost in areas such as wholesaling and retailing, auto supplies, and office supplies busi-
nesses. Id. at 75. For a discussion of ethical considerations surrounding decisions to close factories,
see ichtenberg, lorkers, Owners, and Factory Closings, 4 PHIL. & PUB. POI.'Y 9 (1984).
Studies indicate that the physical and mental health of displaced workers often declines rapidly.
One study undertaken over a 13-year period indicates that the suicide rate among displaced workers
is nearly 30 times the national average. See, eg., Stillman, siipra, at 81. A series of studies indicates
the presence of a higher incidence of hypertension, heart disease, peptic ulcer, diabetes, and other
maladies among workers displaced due to plant shutdowns than among control groups of employed
workers. Kasl & Cobb, Blood Pressure Changes in M.len U ndeigoingJob l.oss, 32 PSYCIIOSOMATIC MEDICINE
19 (1970); Kasl, Cobb & Brooks, Chanmges il Serim)i Uric .-lcid and Cholesterol Levels i .len 'n.dergoi).g Job
I.oss, 206 J. A.M.A. 1500 (1968); Kasl, Gore & Cobb, Changes i Reported Illness a)d Illness Behavior
Related to Termilltion of Employmetvio : .4 Preliminary Report, I INT'I.J. EPIDEMOI.OGY 1 (1972).
190 Roberts, 7he Impact of Techinology oil Iioi Organilzilg and Collective Bargaining, in ABOR AND
TIECIINOI.OGY: UNION RESPONSE TO CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS 26 (1982).
191 Technological innovation is the first commercially successful application of a new technical
idea. Innovation should be distinguished from invention, which is the development of a new techni-
cal idea, and firom diffusion, which is the subsequent widespread adoption of an innovation by those
850 I[Vol. 62:810
TECHNOLOGY BARGAINING
In addition, the employer does not always necessarily have complete and
perfect information concerning alternatives so as to know whether bar-
gaining would be futile. Although the Board and court decisions have
attempted to diminish labor's potential contribution to the decision mak-
ing process, discussed below are various experiences in employee partici-
pation in management which stand in stark contrast to advocates of
management's rights who argue that labor's participation is unworkable,
or at best a hindrance.' 92
Some labor unions have increasingly assumed a more collaborative
role with management in the decision making process. Unions have been
participating in joint committees with management for some time.193
Many of those joint committees still play only a consultative role with
management, exercising no real control. However, some unions, depart-
ing from this consultative role, are assuming a more collaborative role in
the introduction of technology into the workplace. Substantial participa-
tion in management decision making is occurring currently in both the
United States and abroad.' 94 In-depth documentation of the successes
and failures of these activities may be desirable to undertake at a future
time in order to fully explore the opportunities presented by technology
bargaining. Extensive documentation of labor participation in manage-
ment decision making is beyond the scope of this Article. However, this
Article will discuss some representative examples of labor participation
in the introduction of technological change.
The United Automobile Workers (UAW) is one union in particular
which has taken great strides in acquiring some degree of participation in
the decision making process surrounding the introduction of new tech-
nology. The president of the UAW currently sits on the Chrysler Corpo-
ration Board of Directors.195 Certainly this is a striking, albeit atypical,
example of a step toward labor participation in major decisions. The
who did not develop it. The distinction between innovation and diffusion is complicated by the fact
that innovations can rarely be adopted by new users without modification. When modifications are
extensive, the result may be a new innovation. These definitions are drawn from Ashford, Ayers, &
Stone, spra note 166, at 419 n.l.
192 See also S. DEUTSCH, TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS (1985) (re-
port prepared for the Bureau of Labor-Management Relations and Cooperative Programs of the
U.S. Department of Labor). Professor Deutsch has described the historical development of techno-
logical change in the workplace in the U.S. and abroad and has explored trends in labor-manage-
ment cooperation to lessen the negative impact of changes, such as with health hazards or with job
displacement. His findings suggest that positive approaches are being taken by both labor and man-
agement to introduce technology without compromising worker health, safety or job security.
193 See, e.g., L. BACOW, spra note 185; Recent I)itiatives i Labor-.Iwageme.t Cooperation, Report No.
CP76003, National Center for Productivity and Quality of Working Life (Feb. 1976); More .4 wareless
of Health, Safety Isses Comes from Joint Committees, Srvey Finds, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 159 (July 12,
1984);.4to Sipplier SaysJoint Coimmittee Sliaply I creases Productivity, Quiality, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 450
(Nov. 8, 1984).
194 For discussions of employee participation activities abroad, see Chamot and Dymmel, s.pra
note 186; Chamot, Technological Change and noions: .4 In terniational Perspective, a publication of the
Dept. of Professional Employees, AFL-CIO, Aug. 1982; 1Jork ad Health i the 1980 s: Experiences of
Direct IT'orkers'Participatio ill Occitpational Health (Bagnara, Misiti, and Wintersberger eds. 1985) (pro-
ceedings of the Conference on Direct Workers' Participation in Matters of Work, Safety and Health,
held in Nov. 1982 at the Institute of Psychology of the National Research Council of Italy in Rome).
195 Walton, .Vew Perspectives on the T'orld of lltork: Social Choice i the Developlent of.4dvanced Iformia-
tioI Technology, 35 HuMN. REL. 1073, 1078 (1982).
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UAW has taken an aggressive role in ameliorating the impact of techno-
logical change on the work force by promoting joint management-union
efforts. Since 1979, as part of many UAW collective bargaining agree-
ments, management has had a duty to notify ad consult with the union
over any decision to introduce new technology well in advance of imple-
mentation.'9 6 The agreements also provide that a National Joint Com-
mittee on New Technology, composed of five UAW members and five
company members must be established to discuss at the corporate level
any development of new technology, to discuss anticipated problems
concerning the introduction of new technology, and to review and decide
cases appealed from the plant level concerning disputes over the intro-
duction of new technology.' 9 7 In 1982, the UAW reached an agreement
with both the General Motors Corporation and the Ford Motor Corpora-
tion to establish extensive training and retraining programs to mitigate
the impact of technological change.'9 8 In 1984, the UAW reached agree-
ment with General Motors concerning a notable job security feature, the
Job Opportunity Bank-Security (JOB Security) Program. Under the JOB
Security Program, jobs that become unnecessary because of the introduc-
tion of new technology are put into the bank and slowly phased out. The
workers continue to be employed, but they are placed into other jobs as
those jobs open up or new jobs are created. Eventually the bank shrinks
as those workers are placed elsewhere.'9 9 Additionally, for more than a
decade, the UAW along with both General Motors and Ford has jointly
sponsored Quality of Work Life (QWL) activities which have been
designed to ensure that new technology is introduced so as to enhance
the quality of work life in a plant.2 0 0 The UAW's position is that technol-
ogy that advances workers' skills and enhances job content should be
selected over that which downgrades or eliminates job skills whenever
possible.2 01
The UAW is involved in several particularly noteworthy joint labor-
management efforts with General Motors. The UAW is currently in-
volved in a pilot project with General Motors called the "Saturn Project,"
a program to manufacture small cars in the United States. The Saturn
Project is a management-labor project in which management and the
union are jointly studying the feasibility of introducing a new small car.
The union now continues to participate in the design, engineering and
production of the project, which involves many innovative concepts. 20 2
The second significant joint labor-management effort between the
196 Guidellesfor the Iltrodtuctio ad Use ofV New Technolog, UAW-Ford Presentation to Ford Motor
Co., Aug. 6, 1979, at 4-5 [hereinafter UAW-Ford Guidelines]. See also Weekley and MacLeod, Our
I Forkig Futuire: .-1 Guide to enw Techtnology, publication of UAW Skilled Trades Dept., 1985, at 15.
Both publications are available from UAW, Solidarity House, Detroit, MI.
197 UAW-Ford Guidelines, supra note 196, at 6-7; Weekley and MacLeod, spra note 196, at 21.
198 See Letter of Understanding from ErnestJ. Savoie to Donald F. Ephlin re: Employee Develop-
ment and Training Program, Feb. 13, 1982 (available from UAW, Solidarity House, Detroit, MI). See
also Weekley and MacLeod, supra note 196, at 15-16.
199 Cowltract Halts Layoffs Due to Outsourcinig, Technology, UAW-GM Report, Sept. 1984, at 205.
200 See Walton, supra note 195, at 1078.
201 See, e.g., UAW-Ford Guidelines, spra note 196, at 4.




UAW and General Motors is a $100 million New Venture Fund. The
program is an ongoing activity to develop and mutually direct ventures
into new, non-traditional business areas in an effort to expand employ-
ment opportunities for UAW workers. The program is financed entirely
by corporate funds, but provides for full input by the union. The pro-
gram will be administered by a negotiated Growth and Opportunity
Committee, made up of equal numbers of UAW and corporate represent-
atives. The Committee will be assisted by a full-time staff assigned by
General Motors and the UAW known as the New Business Venture De-
velopment Group. The Group will review and study the feasibility of
proposals for entry into new business ventures, make recommendations
to the Committee, and develop employee participation in the new ven-
tures. The Committee will be required to report periodically to the In-
ternational Union and to the General Motors Executive Committee
concerning the identification of viable opportunities for employment
growth. The negotiated agreement that established the program speci-
fled that the Committee should pay particular attention to developing
new ventures in communities that have been affected by the loss of UAW-
GM employment opportunities through plant closings.20 3
An additional UAW-GM cooperative effort is the launch of a compre-
hensive, five-year scientific study concerning the effects on workers of
exposure to chemicals in machining. The jointly administered Occupa-
tional Health Advisory Board has commissioned the Harvard School of
Public Health to conduct the study. The advisory board will work with
the Harvard team during the period of the study, the board will advise
the company and the union concerning appropriate measures or changes
in technology. 20 4
A second union that has become involved with management in the
decision making process is the Communication Workers of America
(CWA). In its collective bargaining agreements, CWA typically includes
provisions that require management to notify the union at least six
months prior to the introduction of technological change. These agree-
ments also contain provisions for training and retraining programs.2 0 5
Although CWA has been active in QWL committees, CWA has not gener-
ally been as aggressively involved with management in the decision mak-
ing process as the UAW has been successful in doing. CWA's
involvement varies from case-to-case. One notable case involves the
AT&T hotel billing and information systems (HOBIS) office in Tempe,
Arizona, near Phoenix. The company wanted to redesign a new system
in that office, its goal, being a successful, self-managed office. The com-
pany approached CWA about participating in the total system design.
The joint management-labor effort resulted in an innovative autonomous
work group where the workers police themselves without supervisors.
203 (1 TI G1I to Decide Jointly on Investmenlts for ',ewz Jobs, UAW-GM Report, Sept. 1984, at 5.
204 ,1 II' and GI Launch Stuidy on Effects of Exposue to Chemnicals in MlIacining, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at
158 (July 12, 1984).
205 Productivit i the4i Americapn Economy, 1982: Hearings Before the Slbcolmmn. o Employmen t and Produtc-
tivity of the Senate Labor oand Human) Resources Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Ronnie
J. Straw, CWA Director of Development and Research). See also Walton, soupra note 195, at 1080.
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The Tempe office has proved to be the most profitable of all AT&T's
HOBIS units throughout the country. 20 6
A third union that has taken strides toward becoming involved in
decisions to introduce technological change is the International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM). IAM has prepared
model contract language calling for advance notification of technological
change along with a meaningful opportunity to negotiate adjustments in
the plan:
In the event of management's introducing new technology it is impera-
tive that the union firmly establish the right to advance notice, the
right to certain kinds of information and the obligation to bargain over
necessary adjustments through clear and specific contract language.
By being required to give advance notice of plans to introduce techno-
logical change, the Union will have time to negotiate all of the neces-
sary adjustment program.2 0 7
In 1983 IAM negotiated a collective bargaining contract with the Boeing
Company which provides that Boeing must notify the union at least one
year in advance of any technological changes, such briefings to include
any anticipated schedules of introduction of new technology. The union
in turn is required to protect the confidentiality of any sensitive or pro-
prietary information disclosed during the discussions.2 0 8 The IAM-Boe-
ing contract also provides for an extensive training program to mitigate
the effects of technological change.2 0 9
The advance notification provisions exemplified by UAW, CWA and
IAM collective bargaining contracts are becoming increasingly com-
mon,210 and represent a significant step toward a cooperative labor-man-
agement approach to the introduction of technological change.
Although advance notification may take different forms in different con-
tracts, it offers the potential for labor to influence design features and
plans of proposed technological change when decisions are being made,
thereby offering greater potential for solving problems and fulfilling
needs of both management and labor.
Labor unions have become quite sophisticated in their efforts to
make positive contributions to the direction of technological develop-
ment, and, as a result, have become an information resource in matters
concerning technological change and development. For example, during
1985 the Subcommittee on Employment and Housing of the House
206 See Miller, The Bossless Ofice: Uliiqute Arizona Experiment Proves Ilorkers Ca1 Rul tile Show (available
from CWA, AFL-CIO, Dev. and Research Dept., Wash., D.C.).
207 Nulty, Case Studies of Local IA.1I Experience with the Introdrtfioni of 'eew Technologies, in LABOR AND
TECHINOLOGY: UNION RESPONSE TO CHANGING ENVIRONMENTS 132 (1982).
208 Article 20, § 20.2, Labor Agreement of the Boeing Company and the International Associa-
tion of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (1983) (available from IAM).
209 Id. § 20.3. S. DEUTSCH, supra note 192, describes workplaces where training programs have
been instituted to facilitate employee adjustment to technological change. Cape Cod (Mass.) Hospi-
tal and the City of Eugene, Oregon are two such places where training programs resulted from
successful negotiations at the bargaining table.
210 See BASIC PATrERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 54-55 (BNA) (10th ed. 1983);Joilnt Hearings before the
Sltbcomm. o Science, Research and Tech)ology of the House Comm. on Science and Techntology and the Task Force
on Educatio)n and Enployment of the House Conmm. on the Budget, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1224-43 (1984)




Committee on Government Operations solicited the aid of several labor
unions in developing legislation on employee protection at hazardous
waste cleanup sites.2 1 ' Also during 1985, a job health research agency,
the Workplace Health Fund, was instituted through the efforts of various
labor unions with assistance from groups representing business,
churches, the environment, and various communities. The Fund is
designed to develop and mobilize support for occupational disease re-
search and education programs to be conducted by the labor community.
It is also designed to provide job health services to workers. 21 2 These
are only two examples of research efforts undertaken by labor unions
through which organized labor is making positive contributions to the
direction and implementation of technological development. Many more
extensive research programs are currently being conducted by labor. 21 3
Deutsch suggests that research support is vitally important in order to
identify creative approaches to the introduction of technology that bene-
fit both management and labor.21 4
The foregoing discussion concerning current involvement of organ-
ized labor in management decision making and in the development of
technology should illustrate that the Board and some courts are not ade-
quately considering current industrial activities when they argue that la-
bor has nothing meaningful to offer to management in its decision
making process. To requote the Supreme Court's majority opinion in
Fibreboard: "Industrial experience is not only reflective of the interests of
labor and management in the subject matter but is also indicative of the
amenability of such subjects to the collective bargaining process." 21 5
III. Conclusion
One purpose of the NLRA is to extend negotiations between labor
and management to areas of critical interest to each side. When Con-
gress established the collective bargaining process, it acknowledged that
an employer inherently possesses a power advantage over labor, and it
attempted to overcome that power advantage by requiring the employer
to meet with labor as an equal party to discuss issues of major concern to
both parties. The legislative history of the NLRA indicates that Congress
initially contemplated that the collective bargaining process be a dynamic
process capable of meeting new problems as they arise in labor-manage-
ment relations. Both management and labor have become very sophisti-
cated both in terms of the scope of their concerns and the methods
employed to advance their concerns, resulting in new issues being
pressed to the forefront of collective bargaining. The collective bargain-
211 Ul'ions Asked to Help Develop Legislation on Hazardous Site Cleanup Protections, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA),
at 839 (Apr. 4, 1985).
212 I 'D Forms Job ealth Research .gency Aimed at Proidihng Services to ToIrkers, O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at
364 (Sept. 26, 1985).
213 See, e.g, l T.I' 11and G.1 Lanvch Study o Effects of Exposure to Chemicals in .Iachlining, O.S.H. Rep.
(BNA), at 158 (July 12, 1984); Ford, (A II' itiate Training Program on Dealing with azardous Chemicals,
O.S.H. Rep. (BNA), at 83 July 4, 1985).
214 See S. D)!E1SCII, spra note 192.
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ing process should be extended to include those new issues so that the
process can evolve with the changing industrial environment.
The language of the NLRA was written in language sufficiently flexi-
ble to permit the Board and courts to adapt it to the times. It does not
appear, however, that the Board and courts are carrying out the purposes
of the Act in light of modern industrial practices. Both the Board and the
courts have traditionally interpreted the NLRA by balancing the respec-
tive interests of management and labor. In doing so, they have carved
out an area of absolute management prerogatives that did not appear on
either the face of the statute nor in its legislative history, and attempted
to separate management rights from rights guaranteed to workers under
the NLRA into two distinct, diametrically opposed spheres. This ap-
proach probably promotes more rather than less industrial strife, and
treats the positions of management and labor as necessarily inconsistent;
however, their positions are not necessarily at odds. Workers constitute
an indispensable part of the American work environment. Hence, it is in
management's best interest to promote the well-being of workers. Simi-
larly, job security is dependent on the continued operation of the firm,
and it is, therefore, in labor's best interest to contribute to the continued
success of the firm. Both of these objectives can be fostered by according
the impact of technological change on the workplace the utmost consid-
eration at the earliest stages of the decision making process. Technologi-
cal change can create both increased profits and employment if planned
properly.
To repeat, although the Supreme Court has not specifically ad-
dressed the issue of technology bargaining, the Court's opinion in First
National Maintenance strongly suggests that the Court would find a duty to
effects bargain, but not a duty to decision bargain. The decisions of the
current Board indicate that it also would not be inclined to find a duty to
bargain over the decision to introduce technological change. First Na-
tional Maintenance and decisions which rely on it presume that labor has
no meaningful contribution to make to the employer's decision making
process. The Board and courts, however, should recognize that more
and more unions are becoming capable of making meaningful contribu-
tions. In applying First National Maintenance, the Board and reviewing
courts should determine whether the value of labor's input has been ade-
quately considered. Labor's potential participation should not be dis-
missed simply on the basis of whether management's decision turns on
labor costs. The Board and courts should consider the question of la-
bor's participation on a case-by-case basis, asking whether labor can con-
tribute to that type of decision.
The failure of the current Board and the Supreme Court to en-
courage collective bargaining discourages cooperative efforts between
management and labor, and may, in the long run, result in economic
warfare. Requiring employers to bargain over the decision to introduce
technological change would establish afoundation for a cooperative envi-
ronment in which to introduce technology. It should be noted, however,
that although decision bargaining may encourage a cooperative environ-
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ment, a confrontational attitude often exists on both sides within the col-
lective bargaining framework. The American labor relations system is
based on an adversarial tradition.21 6 Labor has traditionally sought
greater rights and protections from arbitrary actions by an employer.
Employers have traditionally regarded labor's requests as unwarranted
invasions into management prerogatives. This adversarial stance is re-
flected in the collective bargaining process in the form of a "win-lose"
mentality.
That tradition is changing. Gone are the days when management
and labor relate strictly as adversaries. Although mandating a duty to de-
cision bargain over the introduction of technology is important to ensure
participation in those decisions, national policy should extend the intro-
duction of technological change beyond an adversarial context by en-
couraging cooperative efforts between management and labor. As the
evidence increasingly demonstrates, both management and labor benefit
from successful joint efforts. Numerous commentators and scholars in
the area of labor relations are calling for increased employee participa-
tion with management, citing numerous benefits to both parties. 217 As
the level of cooperation between the parties rises, labor-management re-
lations become less adversarial. The result is stronger labor-manage-
ment relations and solutions to problems that are more inventive and
adaptive.2 8 By focusing on problem solving, economic and social effects
receive more attention, and the technology is better utilized. When man-
agement and labor are committed to solutions, the overall value of work
is improved from which all parties benefit.
The benefits of increased employee participation are not without
some costs. Worker involvement requires extra effort on the part of both
parties. New relationships and skills must be developed. Management,
unions and workers must redefine their respective roles, and experience
the growing pains and uncertainty associated with changing attitudes and
habits. Both management and labor are subject to certain risks and re-
sponsibilities.2 9 Indeed, many problems are inherent in developing a
216 See M. DERBER, THE AMERICAN IDEA OF INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACY 1865-1965 (1970); Summers,
Ildistrial Democrao,: America's Ulfilfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 37 (1979).
217 Employees who are given broader responsibility and who are encouraged to contribute are
found to take more pride and derive more satisfaction from their work. This, in turn, bolsters crea-
tivity and enthusiasm in the workplace, and generally enhances performance, which can be a great
asset in terms of increased productivity, increased quality and reliability of products, and contribu-
tions to new products and production systems. See Bowles, Gordon & Weisskopf,.4 Social M.odelfor
U'.S. Productivit!y Growth, 27 CHALLENGE 41 (1984); Reich,,4 Fork i the Roadfor '.S. Labor, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 1, 1985, at E-13, col.2; Walton, Fromn Cotrol to Cormmwitlet i the ['orkplnce, 63 HARV. Bus. RE'.
76, 77 (1985). Employees also derive some assurance of security when management treats them as
an integral part of the organization, which can also result in increased commitment to the continued
success of the firm. See Walton, supra. See also Chamot, Employees: Idispellsible Elemelts, 31 PROD.
ENG'G. 106 (1984); Cyert, Te Plight of .lnla)factrtilg: IT'hat Ca, Be Done?, I ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND
TECH. 87 (1985); Nowak, II'orkers' ParticipatiOn aid Its Potelltial .4pplicatiol il the nited States, 35 LAB.
L.J. 148 (1984).
218 See Walton, spra note 217, at 78-80.
219 Management must assume some responsibility for increasing the value of work by giving pri-
ority to designing technology in a way that enables employees to work creatively with machines. A
significant risk for management, therefore, is that the technological development process may be-
come more complicated. Management must also demonstrate by policy and practice that it gives
high priority to labor's concern for job security by establishing, for example, programs to retrain
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cooperative model of labor-management relations for the design of tech-
nology policy. However, the long-term benefits to both management
and labor of carefully designing technology policy so that overall labor
quality is improved are vast, particularly for industries facing interna-
tional competition.
Federal labor policy should encourage a change in attitude between
labor and management. Both parties commonly share an assumption,
which is reflected in Board and court decisions, that technological devel-
opment involves certain adverse effects, and that those affected must sim-
ply cope. However, the adversarial stance of management and labor is
inappropriate for the optimal development and implementation of tech-
nology. There is a great need to establish a cooperative attitude between
the parties in order to develop integrative solutions to the complex
problems posed by advancing technology that will address the needs of
management and labor.
employees for more complex tasks. Unions and workers must take greater responsiblity for the
efficiency and continued success of the enterprise. Labor may have to agree to flexible job classifica-
tions and work rules and new compensation methods associated with productivity improvements. Id.
at 80-83.
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